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Abstract 
We develop a new general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with 
heterogeneous firms, variable demand elasticity and multiple asymmetric regions, in which 
trade integration induces wage and productivity changes. Using Canada-US interregional 
trade data, we structurally estimate a theory-based gravity equation system featuring 
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decompose border effects into a pure border effect, relative and absolute wage effects, and a 
selection effect. We then quantify the impacts of removing the trade distortions generated by 
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1 Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, empirical research has uncovered a series of stylized facts about
firms in international trade that hold across a large number of countries and industries. Firstly,
only a small share of firms is engaged in foreign trade, and these firms differ along various
dimensions from those operating entirely in domestic markets. Exporters are, in particular,
larger and more productive than non-exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Clerides et al., 1998;
Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw et al., 2000; Tybout, 2003; Bernard et al., 2009). Secondly,
most exporters earn only a small fraction of their revenue in foreign markets, and only a small
share of exporting firms accounts for the lion’s share of total export sales. Put differently, the
bulk of exporters has a fairly low export intensity and the export sales distribution is skewed
towards a small number of very large enterprises (Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Bernard et al.,
2003, 2007a). Thirdly, firm-level productivity differences are a channel through which trade
liberalization brings about aggregate productivity gains. The reason is that trade liberalization
increases competition, reduces markups, and forces the least efficient producers to leave the
market, thereby reallocating market shares from low to high productivity firms (Aw et al., 2000;
Pavcnik, 2002; Trefler, 2004; Bernard et al., 2007a).
Two recent strands of literature have moved firm-level productivity differences to the heart
of trade analysis. The first strand, originating in the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003),
extends an intra-industry trade model of monopolistic competition to allow for productivity
differences across firms. That model can cope with the stylized facts mentioned above, namely
that only the most productive firms operate in export markets and that trade liberalization in-
duces aggregate productivity gains. The framework has, however, two rather restrictive features
which make it difficult to take it to data: its reliance on symmetric countries with factor price
equalization (FPE) and constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Though analytically conve-
nient, the first feature is clearly at odds with the facts and neglects the general equilibrium
impacts of differential factor price adjustments following trade liberalization across asymmetric
countries. The second feature generates constant price-cost margins, which does not accord with
recent empirical evidence that increasing trade integration and larger market size put downward
pressure on markups (Syverson, 2004; Badinger, 2007).
To deal with these limitations, several alternatives have been put forward in the literature.
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) propose a monopolistic competition model with multiple asymmet-
ric countries in which markups do depend on trade costs, firm-level productivity, and market
size. However, FPE still holds in their trade equilibrium. Furthermore, their quasi-linear setup
channels all income effects towards a nume´raire good, which gives the analysis a partial equilib-
rium flavor. Bernard et al. (2007b) embed Melitz’s model into a Heckscher-Ohlin framework,
thereby allowing for factor price differences between two asymmetric countries. They rely, how-
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ever, on the CES specification so that markups are again constant. In addition, extending their
model beyond two countries, as required for taking it to data, is not straightforward.
The second strand of literature, rooted in the seminal contribution by Bernard et al. (2003),
extends the Eaton and Kortum (2002) Ricardian model to allow for imperfect competition.
That framework can accomodate multiple asymmetric countries, thus making it suitable as a
basis for empirical work and counterfactual analysis. Furthermore, FPE is relaxed by assuming
exogenous wage differences across countries.1 The model by Bernard et al. (2003) can replicate
several firm-level facts, in particular that the bulk of exporters has a fairly low export intensity.
Despite its good empirical performance, their framework also displays three rather restrictive
features: each market is served by a single firm per industry only (the lowest-cost supplier);
the set of goods is fixed; and markups are independent of the number of competing firms and
identically distributed across countries. These features are also at odds with the facts. There is
indeed growing evidence that trade substantially expands the set of imported varieties, which is
an important channel through which gains from trade materialize (Krugman, 1979, 1980; Broda
and Weinstein, 2006). Furthermore, as argued before, price-cost margins are, in reality, affected
by trade integration and by market size.
Our first contribution is to develop a unified theoretical framework that encompasses the key
advantages of both the Melitz (2003) and the Bernard et al. (2003) types of approaches. More
precisely, building on Behrens and Murata (2007), we propose a new general equilibrium model
of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms, variable demand elasticity and multiple
asymmetric regions, in which wages and markups are endogenous and need not be equalized. Our
model is thus well equipped to trace out the impacts of trade integration on wages, productivity,
and price-cost margins. Our framework is furthermore tractable enough to allow for clear-cut
comparative static results with two asymmetric regions. We show, in particular, that if the two
regions differ in size or technological possibilities, the larger or technologically more advanced
region has the higher wage, productivity and welfare than the other region. Furthermore, trade
integration favors convergence of regional wages and average productivities as bilateral trade
barriers fall. These changes inevitably affect trade flows and welfare and must be taken into
consideration when trying to assess the impacts of liberalization.
Our second contribution is to illustrate how our multi-region model can be taken to data
by relating it to the vast literature on ‘gravity equations’ (McCallum, 1995; Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003). As is well known, gravity equations can be derived from trade models by using
the value of exports between trading partners. The conventional method for estimating those
equations is to rely on exporter and importer fixed effects. While such a procedure yields consis-
1Alvarez and Lucas (2007) extend the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model with perfect competition to include
endogenously determined wages. To the best of our knowledge, such an extension is missing to date for the model
by Bernard et al. (2003) with imperfect competition.
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tent estimates of the trade friction parameters (Feenstra, 2004), it ignores labor market clearing,
zero profit and trade balance conditions that must hold in general equilibrium. As shown by An-
derson and van Wincoop (2003), disregarding equilibrium constraints places severe limitations
on the usefulness of gravity equations for conducting counterfactual analysis. We hence derive a
gravity equation system featuring both endogenous wages and productivity (firm selection) that
subsume all the equilibrium information of our model.2 Using Canada-US interregional trade
data, we then structurally estimate the model’s key parameters that are compatible with the
equilibrium wages and productivity distributions.
Using the estimated parameter values, our last contribution is to conduct a counterfactual
experiment in the spirit of Bernard et al. (2003), where we quantify the impacts of eliminating all
trade distortions generated by the Canada-US border.3 In so doing, we make use of the general
equilibrium constraints to solve for regional wages and productivities that would prevail in a
borderless world. This allows us to compute a series of bilateral border effects which illustrate
how trade flows between any two regions would be affected by the trade integration and the
induced wage and productivity responses. These bilateral border effects can be decomposed
into a ‘pure’ border effect, relative and absolute wage effects, and a selection effect. We use
this decomposition to provide a detailed account of each channel’s contribution to changes in
trade flows across Canadian provinces and US states. One key insight is that disregarding the
endogenous wage and productivity responses leads to a substantial upward bias of Canadian
bilateral border effects (by up to 50%).
What would be the regional effects for Canadian provinces and US states of our counterfactual
trade integration scenario? Our analysis reveals that the border removal between Canada and
the US would lead to higher average productivity, greater consumption diversity, and welfare
gains for all provinces and states. Canadian labor productivity would rise by 5.71%, a figure
that is roughly similar to the one estimated by Trefler (2004) for the 1988 Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement.4 The corresponding US figure is much smaller, with just a 0.3% labor productivity
gain. The trade integration would favor wage convergence across the two countries. In fact, the
2Several recent contributions have derived gravity equations with heterogeneous firms (e.g., Chaney, 2008;
Helpman et al., 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). In all these models, however, wages are either equalized or
assumed to differ exogenously across regions.
3Bernard et al. (2003) consider the effects of a generalized 5-percent drop in trade costs and a 10-percent
exogenous increase in the US relative wage. Whereas their Ricardian model is well suited to analyze trade among
dissimilar countries, our monopolistic competition model is better suited to assess the impacts of trade integration
among similar countries like Canada and the US.
4Trefler (2004, pp.880-881) estimates that Canadian labor productivity increased by 7.4%. It is worth empha-
sizing that he attributes the sources of these productivity gains to “market share shifts favoring high-productivity
plants. Such share shifting would come about from the growth of high-productivity plants and the demise and/or
exit of low-productivity plants [. . .]”. These are precisely the key channels highlighted by our model.
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relative wages in the Canadian provinces would rise by 1.79% to 5.84%.5 Our counterfactual
analysis also reveals that Canadian regional markups would fall by 1.78% to 5.19% and US
regional markups would fall by 0.12% to 1.08%, thereby providing an idea of the magnitude of
the pro-competitive effects of trade integration. Given those results, welfare gains are larger in
Canada than in the US, averaging 10% and 3%, respectively. One important insight from our
analysis is that endogenous wage and productivity responses are far from being uniform across
Canadian provinces and US states. Investigating what drives these regional variations, we find
that geography and size matter: less populous regions closer to the border tend to be more
affected by the border removal.
We finally investigate the firm-level properties of our model by generating two large firm
samples randomly drawn from the fitted productivity distributions of the different Canadian
provinces and US states before and after the hypothetical border removal. This exercise firstly
reveals that we can replicate fairly well several stylized facts, in particular that the productivity
distribution of exporters lies to the right of that of non-exporters, that a very small share of
exporters accounts for the bulk of export sales, and that the vast majority of exporters have a
fairly low export intensity. Secondly, our analysis provides us with some novel explanations for
current issues in firm-level studies. It has, for example, been shown that exporters’ and domestic
firms’ productivity distributions exhibit a sizeable overlap (Bernard et al., 2009). Our framework
does deliver such an overlap because countries have an internal geography and because wages
are not equalized across regions. Moreover, although selection due to trade integration works as
a simple left-truncation of the regional productivity distributions in our model, the associated
country-wise changes are more complex.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and
deals with the closed economy case. In Section 3 we extend it to a multi-region framework and
prove analytical results for the case of two asymmetric regions. Section 4 derives the gravity
equation system, describes the data, and presents the estimation procedure and results. In
Section 5 we carry out the counterfactual experiment of removing the Canada-US border and
discuss the associated regional and firm-level impacts. Section 6 concludes.
2 Closed economy
Consider a closed economy with a final consumption good, provided as a continuum of hori-
zontally differentiated varieties. We denote by Ω the endogenously determined set of available
5We choose the wage in one US state (Alabama) as the nume´raire. Though not directly comparable, our
results for the relative wage increases in the Canadian provinces would therefore not be far away from the 3-5%
wage increases reported by Trefler (2004, p.885).
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varieties, with measure N . There are L consumers, each of whom supplies inelastically one unit
of labor, which is the only factor of production.
2.1 Preferences and demands
All consumers have identical preferences which display ‘love of variety’ and give rise to demands
with variable elasticity. Following Behrens and Murata (2007), the utility maximization problem
of a representative consumer is given by:
max
q(j), j∈Ω
U ≡
∫
Ω
[
1− e−αq(j)
]
dj s.t.
∫
Ω
p(j)q(j)dj = E, (1)
where E denotes expenditure; p(j) > 0 and q(j) ≥ 0 stand for the price and the per capita
consumption of variety j; and α > 0 is a parameter. As shown by Behrens and Murata (2007),
solving (1) yields the following demand functions:
q(i) =
E
Np
−
1
α
{
ln
[
p(i)
Np
]
+ h
}
, ∀i ∈ Ω, (2)
where
p ≡
1
N
∫
Ω
p(j)dj and h ≡ −
∫
Ω
ln
[
p(j)
Np
]
p(j)
Np
dj
denote the average price and the differential entropy of the price distribution, respectively. Since
marginal utility at zero consumption is bounded, the demand for a variety need not be positive.
Indeed, as can be seen from (2), the demand for variety i is positive if and only if its price is
lower than the reservation price pd. Formally,
q(i) > 0 ⇐⇒ p(i) < pd ≡ Np e
αE
Np
−h. (3)
Note that the reservation price pd is a function of the price aggregates p and h. Combining
expressions (2) and (3) allows us to express the demand for variety i concisely as follows:
q(i) =
1
α
ln
[
pd
p(i)
]
. (4)
2.2 Technology and market structure
The labor market is assumed to be perfectly competitive so that all firms take the wage rate w
as given. Prior to production, each firm engages in research and development, which requires
a fixed amount F of labor paid at the market wage. Each firm discovers its marginal labor
requirement m(i) ≥ 0 only after making this irreversible investment. We assume that m(i) is
drawn from a common and known, continuously differentiable distribution G. Since research
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and development costs are sunk, a firm will survive (i.e., operate) in the market provided it can
charge a price p(i) above marginal cost m(i)w.
Each surviving firm sets its price to maximize operating profit
pi(i) = L
[
p(i)−m(i)w
]
q(i), (5)
where q(i) is given by (4). Since there is a continuum of firms, no individual firm has any impact
on pd so that the first-order conditions for (operating) profit maximization are given by:
ln
[
pd
p(i)
]
=
p(i)−m(i)w
p(i)
, ∀i ∈ Ω. (6)
A price distribution satisfying (6) is called a price equilibrium. Multiplying both sides of (6) by
p(i), integrating over Ω, and using (4) yield the average price as follows:
p = mw +
αE
N
, (7)
where m ≡ (1/N)
∫
Ω
m(j)dj denotes the average marginal labor requirement of the surviving
firms. Observe that expression (7) displays pro-competitive effects, i.e., the average price is
decreasing in the mass of surviving firms N .
Equations (4) and (6) imply that q(i) = (1/α)[1 − m(i)w/p(i)], which allows us to derive
the upper and lower bounds for the marginal labor requirement. The maximum output is given
by q(i) = 1/α at m(i) = 0. The minimum output is given by q(i) = 0 at p(i) = m(i)w, which
by (6) implies that p(i) = pd. Therefore, the cutoff marginal labor requirement is defined as
md ≡ pd/w. A firm that draws md is indifferent between producing and not producing, whereas
all firms with a draw below (resp., above) md remain in (resp., exit from) the market.
Since firms differ only by their marginal labor requirement, we can express all firm-level
variables in terms ofm. Solving (6) by using the LambertW function, defined as ϕ = W (ϕ)eW (ϕ),
the profit-maximizing prices and quantities, as well as operating profits, can be expressed as
follows:
p(m) =
mw
W
, q(m) =
1
α
(1−W ), pi(m) =
Lmw
α
(
W−1 +W − 2
)
, (8)
where we suppress the argument em/md of W to alleviate notation. It is readily verified that
W ′ > 0 for all non-negative arguments and that W (0) = 0 and W (e) = 1 (see Appendix A.1
for the derivation of (8) and the properties of W ). Hence, 0 ≤ W ≤ 1 if 0 ≤ m ≤ md. The
expressions in (8) show that a firm with a draw md charges a price equal to marginal cost, faces
zero demand, and earns zero operating profit. Since W ′ > 0, we readily obtain ∂p(m)/∂m > 0,
∂q(m)/∂m < 0 and ∂pi(m)/∂m < 0. In words, firms with better draws charge lower prices, sell
larger quantities, and earn higher operating profits than firms with worse draws.
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2.3 Equilibrium
We now state the equilibrium conditions for the closed economy, which consist of zero expected
profits and labor market clearing. First, given the mass of entrants NE , the mass of surviving
firms can be written as N = NEG(md). Using (5), the zero expected profit condition for each
firm is given by:
L
∫ md
0
[p(m)−mw] q(m)dG(m) = Fw, (9)
which, combined with (8), can be rewritten as
L
α
∫ md
0
m
(
W−1 +W − 2
)
dG(m) = F. (10)
As the left-hand side of (10) is strictly increasing in md from 0 to ∞, there always exists a
unique equilibrium cutoff (see Appendix A.2). Furthermore, the labor market clearing condition
is given by:6
NE
[
L
∫ md
0
mq(m)dG(m) + F
]
= L, (11)
which, combined with (8), can be rewritten as
NE
[
L
α
∫ md
0
m (1−W ) dG(m) + F
]
= L. (12)
Given the equilibrium cutoff md, equation (12) can be uniquely solved for NE .
How does population size affect entry and firms’ survival probabilities? Using the equilibrium
conditions (10) and (12), we can show that a larger L leads to more entrants NE and a smaller
cutoffmd, respectively (see Appendix A.3). The effect of population size on the mass of surviving
firms N is in general ambiguous. However, under the commonly made assumption that firms’
productivity draws 1/m follow a Pareto distribution
G(m) =
( m
mmax
)k
,
with upper bound mmax > 0 and shape parameter k ≥ 1, we can show that N is increasing in L.7
Using this distributional assumption, we readily obtain closed-form solutions for the equilibrium
cutoff and mass of entrants:
md =
[
αF (mmax)k
κ2L
] 1
k+1
and NE =
κ2
κ1 + κ2
L
F
,
6Note that by using (9) and the budget constraint NE
∫md
0
p(m)q(m)dG(m) = E, we obtain EL/(wNE) =
L
∫md
0
mq(m)dG(m) + F which, together with (11), yields E = w in equilibrium.
7The Pareto distribution has been extensively used in the previous literature on heterogeneous firms (e.g.,
Bernard et al., 2007; Helpman et al., 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
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where κ1 and κ2 are positive constants that solely depend on k (see Appendices B.1 and B.2).
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The mass of surviving firms is then given as follows:
N =
κ
1
k+1
2
κ1 + κ2
( α
mmax
) k
k+1
(
L
F
) 1
k+1
,
which is increasing in population size L. One can further check that N is decreasing in the fixed
labor requirement F and in the upper bound mmax. Finally, since m = [k/(k+1)]md holds when
productivity follows a Pareto distribution, a larger population also maps into higher average
productivity 1/m.
3 Open economy
We now turn to the open economy case. As dealing with two regions only marginally alleviates
the notational burden, we first derive the equilibrium conditions for the general case with K
asymmetric regions that we use when taking our model to the data. We then present some
clear-cut analytical results for the special case of two asymmetric regions in order to guide the
intuition for the general case.
3.1 Preferences and demands
Preferences in the open economy case are analogous to the ones described in the previous section.
Let psr(i) and qsr(i) denote the price and the per capita consumption of variety i when it is
produced in region s and consumed in region r. The utility maximization problem of a consumer
in region r is given by:
max
qsr(j), j∈Ωsr
Ur ≡
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
[
1− e−αqsr(j)
]
dj s.t.
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
psr(j)qsr(j)dj = Er, (13)
where Ωsr denotes the set of varieties produced in region s and consumed in region r. It is
readily verified that the demand functions are given as follows:
qsr(i) =
Er
N crpr
−
1
α
{
ln
[
psr(i)
N crpr
]
+ hr
}
, ∀i ∈ Ωsr,
where N cr is the mass of varieties consumed in region r, and
pr ≡
1
N cr
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
psr(j)dj and hr ≡ −
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
ln
[
psr(j)
N crpr
]
psr(j)
N crpr
dj
denote the average price and the differential entropy of the price distribution of all varieties
consumed in region r. As in the closed economy case, the demand for domestic variety i (resp.,
8For this solution to be consistent, we must ensure that md ≤ mmax, i.e., mmax ≥ αF/(κ2L).
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foreign variety j) is positive if and only if the price of variety i (resp., variety j) is lower than
the reservation price pdr . Formally,
qrr(i) > 0 ⇐⇒ prr(i) < p
d
r and qsr(j) > 0 ⇐⇒ psr(j) < p
d
r ,
where pdr ≡ N
c
rpre
αEr/(Ncr pr)−hr is a function of the price aggregates pr and hr. The demands for
domestic and foreign varieties can then be concisely expressed as follows:
qrr(i) =
1
α
ln
[
pdr
prr(i)
]
and qsr(j) =
1
α
ln
[
pdr
psr(j)
]
. (14)
3.2 Technology and market structure
Technology and the entry process are identical to the ones described in Section 2. We assume
that shipments from r to s are subject to trade costs τrs > 1 for all r and s, that markets are
segmented, and that firms are free to price discriminate.
Firms in region r independently draw their productivities from a region-specific distribution
Gr. Assuming that firms incur trade costs in terms of labor, the operating profit of firm i in r
is given by:
pir(i) =
∑
s
pirs(i) =
∑
s
Lsqrs(i) [prs(i)− τrsmr(i)wr] . (15)
Each firm maximizes (15) with respect to its prices prs(i) separately. Since it has no impact on
the price aggregates and on the wages, the first-order conditions are given by:
ln
[
pds
prs(i)
]
=
prs(i)− τrsmr(i)wr
prs(i)
, ∀i ∈ Ωrs. (16)
We first solve for the average price in region r. To do so, multiply (16) by prs(i), use (14),
integrate over Ωrs, and finally sum the resulting expressions to obtain
pr ≡
1
N cr
∑
s
∫
Ωsr
psr(j)dj =
1
N cr
∑
s
τsrws
∫
Ωsr
ms(j)dj +
αEr
N cr
, (17)
where the first term is the average of marginal delivered costs in region r. Expression (17) shows
that pr is decreasing in the mass N
c
r of firms competing in region r, which is similar to the result
on pro-competitive effects established in the closed economy case.
Equations (14) and (16) imply that qrs(i) = (1/α)[1− τrsmr(i)wr/prs(i)], which shows that
qrs(i) = 0 at prs(i) = τrsmr(i)wr. It then follows from (16) that prs(i) = p
d
s . Hence, a firm
located in r with draw mxrs ≡ p
d
s/(τrswr) is just indifferent between selling and not selling in
region s. All firms in r with draws below mxrs are productive enough to sell to region s. In what
follows, we refer to mxss ≡ m
d
s as the domestic cutoff in region s, whereas m
x
rs with r 6= s is the
export cutoff. Export and domestic cutoffs are linked as follows:
mxrs =
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds . (18)
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Expression (18) reveals how trade costs and wage differentials affect firms’ ability to break into
foreign markets. When wages are equalized (wr = ws) and internal trade is costless (τss = 1),
all export cutoffs must fall short of the domestic cutoffs since τrs > 1. In that case, breaking
into any foreign market is always harder than selling domestically. However, in the presence of
wage differentials and internal trade costs, the domestic and the foreign cutoffs can no longer
be clearly ranked. The usual ranking, namely that exporting to s is more difficult than selling
domestically in s, prevails only when τssws < τrswr.
9
The first-order conditions (16) can be solved as in the closed economy case. Switching to
notation in terms of m, the profit-maximizing prices and quantities, as well as operating profits,
are given by:
prs(m) =
τrsmwr
W
, qrs(m) =
1
α
(1−W ) , pirs =
Lsτrsmwr
α
(W−1 +W − 2), (19)
where W denotes the Lambert W function with argument eτrsmwr/p
d
s , which we suppress to
alleviate notation. It is readily verified that more productive firms again charge lower prices,
sell larger quantities, and earn higher operating profits.
Observe that in an open economy, the masses of varieties consumed and produced in each
region need not be the same. Given a mass of entrants NEr , only N
p
r = N
E
r Gr (maxs {m
x
rs})
firms survive, namely those which are productive enough to sell at least in one market. Finally,
the mass of varieties consumed in region r is given by
N cr =
∑
s
NEs Gs(m
x
sr). (20)
3.3 Equilibrium
The zero expected profit condition for each firm in region r is given by∑
s
Ls
∫ mxrs
0
[prs(m)− τrsmwr] qrs(m)dGr(m) = Frwr, (21)
where Fr is the region-specific fixed labor requirement. Furthermore, each labor market clears
in equilibrium, which requires that
NEr
[∑
s
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
mqrs(m)dGr(m) + Fr
]
= Lr. (22)
Last, trade is balanced for each region:
NEr
∑
s 6=r
Ls
∫ mxrs
0
prs(m)qrs(m)dGr(m) = Lr
∑
s 6=r
NEs
∫ mxsr
0
psr(m)qsr(m)dGs(m).
9As recently emphasized by Foster et al. (2008), firm selection and export performance depend more generally
on profitability. In addition to physical productivity, locational heterogeneity matters in our model because firms
face different wages and have different market access depending on which region they are located in.
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As in the foregoing section, we can restate the equilibrium conditions using the Lambert W
function (see Appendix C for details).
In what follows, we assume that productivity draws 1/m follow Pareto distributions with
identical shape parameters k ≥ 1. However, to capture differences in local technological possi-
bilities, we allow the upper bounds to vary across regions, i.e., Gr(m) = (m/m
max
r )
k. A lower
mmaxr implies that firms in region r have a higher probability of drawing a better productivity.
Under the Pareto distributions, the equilibrium conditions can be greatly simplified. First, using
the expressions in Appendices B.1 and C.1, labor market clearing requires that
NEr
[
κ1
α (mmaxr )
k
∑
s
Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
+ Fr
]
= Lr. (23)
Second, using the expressions in Appendices B.2 and C.2, zero expected profits imply that
µmaxr ≡
αFr (m
max
r )
k
κ2
=
∑
s
Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
, (24)
where µmaxr is a simple monotonic transformation of the upper bounds. Last, using the expres-
sions in Appendices B.3 and C.3, balanced trade requires that
NEr wr
(mmaxr )
k
∑
s 6=r
Lsτrs
(
τss
τrs
ws
wr
mds
)k+1
= Lr
∑
s 6=r
τsr
NEs ws
(mmaxs )
k
(
τrr
τsr
wr
ws
mdr
)k+1
. (25)
The 3K conditions (23)–(25) depend on 3K unknowns: the wages wr, the masses of entrants
NEr , and the domestic cutoffs m
d
r . The export cutoffs m
x
rs can then be computed using (18).
Combining (23) and (24) immediately shows that
NEr =
κ2
κ1 + κ2
Lr
Fr
. (26)
The mass of entrants in region r therefore positively depends on that region’s size Lr and
negatively on its fixed labor requirement Fr.
Adding the term in r that is missing on both sides of (25), and using (24) and (26), we obtain
the following equilibrium relationship:
1
(mdr)
k+1
=
∑
s
Lsτrr
(
τrr
τsr
wr
ws
)k
1
µmaxs
. (27)
Expressions (24) and (27) summarize how wages, upper bounds, cutoffs, trade costs and popu-
lation sizes are related in general equilibrium.
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3.4 Two-region case
Our model allows for clear-cut comparative static results with two asymmetric regions. Us-
ing (24)–(26), an equilibrium can be characterized by a system of three equations with three
unknowns (the two cutoffs md1 and m
d
2, and the relative wage w1/w2) as follows:
µmax1 = L1τ11
(
md1
)k+1
+ L2τ12
(
τ22
τ12
w2
w1
md2
)k+1
(28)
µmax2 = L2τ22
(
md2
)k+1
+ L1τ21
(
τ11
τ21
w1
w2
md1
)k+1
(29)(
w1
w2
)2k+1
=
(
τ21
τ12
)k (
τ22
τ11
)k+1(
md2
md1
)k+1(
µmax2
µmax1
)
. (30)
Equations (28) and (29) can readily be solved for the cutoffs as a function of the relative wage
ω ≡ w1/w2:
(md1)
k+1 =
µmax1
L1τ11
1− ρ
(
τ22
τ12
)k
ω−(k+1)
1−
(
τ11τ22
τ12τ21
)k and (md2)k+1 = µmax2L2τ22
1− ρ−1
(
τ11
τ21
)k
ωk+1
1−
(
τ22τ11
τ21τ12
)k , (31)
where ρ ≡ µmax2 /µ
max
1 captures relative technological possibilities. A larger ρ (given Fr) implies,
ceteris paribus, that firms in region 2 face a higher probability of drawing a worse productivity
than those in region 1. Substituting the cutoffs (31) into (30) yields after some simplification
LHS ≡ ωk = ρ
L1
L2
(
τ21
τ12
)k
ρτ−k11 − τ
−k
21 ω
k+1
τ−k22 ω
k+1 − ρτ−k12
≡ RHS. (32)
Assume that intraregional trade is less costly than interregional trade, i.e., τ11 < τ21 and τ22 < τ12.
Then, the RHS of (32) is decreasing in ω on its relevant domain, whereas the LHS is increasing
in ω. Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium such that the equilibrium relative wage ω∗ is
bounded by relative trade costs τ22/τ12 and τ21/τ11, relative technological possibilities ρ, and the
shape parameter k (see Appendix A.4).
Since the RHS of (32) is decreasing in ω, the comparative static results are straightforward
to derive. In Appendix A.5 we show that, everything else equal: (i) the larger region has the
higher wage, the lower cutoff and the higher welfare; (ii) the region with better technological
possibilities has the higher wage, the lower cutoff, and the higher welfare; (iii) the region with
the lower internal trade costs has the higher wage, the lower cutoff, and the higher welfare;
(iv) if one region has better access to the other, that region has the higher wage, the lower
cutoff and the higher welfare. Furthermore, we show that when the regions differ in size or
technological possibilities, (v) wages, cutoffs and welfare converge between the regions as bilateral
trade barriers fall.
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4 Estimation
In this section we take the model with K asymmetric regions to the data. To this end, we first
derive a theory-based gravity equation with general equilibrium constraints. Using the well-
known Canada-US regional trade flow dataset by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we then
structurally estimate trade friction parameters as well as other variables of the model. In the
next section we turn to a counterfactual analysis, where we consider the impacts of a hypothetical
decrease in trade frictions on various variables.
4.1 Gravity equation system
The value of exports from region r to region s is given by
Xrs = N
E
r Ls
∫ mxrs
0
prs(m)qrs(m)dGr(m).
Using equations (19), (26), and the Pareto distribution forGr(m), we obtain the following gravity
equation:10
Xrs
LrLs
= τ−krs τ
k+1
ss (ws/wr)
k+1wr
(
mds
)k+1
(µmaxr )
−1 . (33)
As can be seen from (33), exports depend on bilateral trade costs τrs, internal trade costs in the
destination τss, origin and destination wages wr and ws, destination productivity m
d
s , and origin
technological possibilities µmaxr . A higher relative wage ws/wr raises the value of exports as firms
in r face relatively lower production costs, whereas a higher absolute wage wr raises the value
of exports by increasing export prices prs. Furthermore, a larger m
d
s raises the value of exports
since firms located in the destination are on average less productive. Last, a lower µmaxr implies
that firms in region r have higher expected productivity, which raises the value of their exports.
Conditions (24) and (27) give us the following general equilibrium constraints:
µmaxr =
∑
v
Lvτ
−k
rv τ
k+1
vv
(
wv
wr
)k+1 (
mdv
)k+1
r = 1, 2. . . .K (34)
1
(mds)
k+1
=
∑
v
Lvτ
−k
vs τ
k+1
ss
(
ws
wv
)k
(µmaxv )
−1 s = 1, 2, . . .K (35)
The gravity equation system consists of the gravity equation (33) and the 2K general equilibrium
constraints (34) and (35) that summarize the interactions between the 2K endogenous variables,
namely the wages and cutoffs.
10Contrary to standard practice in the gravity literature, we do not move the GDPs but instead move the
population sizes to the left-hand side. Applying the former approach to our model would amount to assuming
that wages are exogenous in the gravity estimation, which is not the case in general equilibrium (see Bergstrand,
1985, for an early contribution on this issue).
14
Expressions (34) and (35) are reminiscent of the constraints in Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), who argue that general equilibrium interdependencies need to be taken into account when
conducting a counterfactual analysis based on the gravity equation.11 One of our contributions is
to go a step further by extending their approach to cope with endogenous wages and productivity.
Note that expression (33) is similar to gravity equations that have been derived in previous
models with heterogeneous firms. These models rely, however, on exogenous wages (Chaney,
2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) and also often disregard general equilibrium constraints when
being estimated (Helpman et al., 2008).12
4.2 Data and estimation procedure
To estimate the gravity equation system (33)–(35), we rely on aggregate bilateral trade flows
Xrs and internal absorption Xrr for 10 Canadian provinces and 30 US states in 1993.
13 We
further have geographical coordinates of the capitals, regional surface measures, and regional
population sizes Lr in 1993 for these 40 regions. The latter are obtained from Statistics Canada
and the US Census Bureau. For the specification of trade costs τrs we stick to standard practice
by assuming that τrs ≡ d
γ
rse
θbrs, where drs stands for distance between r and s and is computed
using the great circle formula. The internal distances are measured as drr = (2/3)
√
surfacer/pi
like in Redding and Venables (2004).14 The term brs is a border dummy valued 1 if r and s are
not in the same country and 0 otherwise. With this specification of trade costs we relate our
analysis to the vast literature on border effects (McCallum 1995), which has shown that regional
trade flows are not only affected by physical distance, but also by the presence of the Canada-US
border. The trade friction parameters γ and θ are to be estimated.
The estimation of the gravity equation system poses four main difficulties which we need
to deal with. First, although we need to obtain the value of the shape parameter k, it cannot
be structurally identified from the estimated parameters of the model. We thus proceed as
follows. We choose an arbitrary initial value for k to estimate the gravity equation system as
11It is tempting to treat wr, ws,m
d
s and µ
max
r as fixed effects in equation (33) by ignoring the general equilibrium
constraints (34) and (35), as has been frequently done before. However, this approach cannot be used for a
counterfactual analysis since the effect of the hypothetical decrease in trade frictions on the estimated fixed
effects is not known. In our approach, the endogenous responses of wages and cutoffs are crucial when evaluating
the counterfactual trade liberalization scenario below.
12One exception is Balistreri and Hillberry (2007), who allow regional incomes to adjust in response to trade
liberalization. However, they do not consider firm heterogeneity in their analysis and take regional incomes as
given in the gravity estimation.
13This publicly available data set has been widely used in the literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003;
Feenstra 2004), which makes it easy to compare our results to existing ones.
14As a robustness check we also consider the alternative measure drr = (1/4)mins6=r{drs} as in Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003). Results are little sensitive to that choice.
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described below. Using the estimates thus obtained, as well as the chosen value of k, we then
compute the productivity advantage of exporters from a random sample of 100,000 US firms
drawn from the fitted productivity distributions of our model (see Section 5.3 and Appendix D
for the procedure). We repeat this procedure for different values of k until our sample allows
us to match the 33% productivity advantage of US exporters that is reported by Bernard et
al. (2003) from 1992 Census of Manufactures data. This calibration yields k = 9.5, which we
henceforth take as our benchmark.15
Second, there exists no data for µmaxr as it depends on the unobservables α, Fr and m
max
r . To
address this issue, we use the general equilibrium constraints (34) and (35). Ideally, we would
plug data for µmaxr into these 2K constraints to solve for the 2K endogenous variables wr andm
d
r .
However, as µmaxr is unobservable, we rely instead on data for the K cutoffs m
d
s . This allows us
to solve the 2K constraints (34) and (35) for theoretically consistent values of the 2K variables
wr and µ
max
r . Observe that, under the Pareto distribution, the domestic cutoff in each region is
proportional to the inverse of the average productivity, i.e., mdr = [(k + 1)/k]mr. We measure
mr by using the GDP per employee in Canadian dollars for each province and state in 1993,
which is obtained from Statistics Canada and the US Census Bureau. Once we have computed
the theory-consistent values of wr from the general equilibrium constraints, we can evaluate the
model fit by comparing computed with observed wages.16
Third, the estimates of the trade friction parameters γ and θ depend on wr and µ
max
r , which
depend themselves on the estimates of γ and θ. Put differently, the constraints (34) and (35)
include the trade friction parameters, but to estimate the parameters of the gravity equation
we need the solution to these constraints. We tackle this problem by estimating the gravity
equation system iteratively. To summarize, our procedure consists of the following steps:
1. Given our specification of τrs, the gravity equation (33) can be rewritten in log-linear
stochastic form as follows:
ln
(
Xrs
LrLs
)
= −kγ ln drs−kθbrs + ζ
1
r + ζ
2
s + εrs, (36)
where all terms specific to the origin and the destination are collapsed into exporter and
importer fixed effects ζ1r and ζ
2
s ; and where εrs is an error term with the usual properties.
From (36), we obtain initial unconstrained estimates of the parameters (γ̂′, θ̂′).17
15As additional robustness checks we also consider k = 3.6, which is the value that has been used by Bernard
et al. (2003), as well as k = 8.5 and 10.5. The qualitative results do not change with the value of k.
16We construct observed wages across provinces and states using hourly wage data from Statistics Canada and
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In order to match the unit of measurement of trade and GDP data, we compute
average yearly wages in million Canadian dollars based on an average of 1930 hours worked yearly in Canada,
and 2080 hours worked yearly in the US in 1993.
17Although we could choose the initial values for (γ̂′, θ̂′) arbitrarily, the fixed effects estimates provide a reason-
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2. Using the initial estimates (γ̂′, θ̂′) and the observed cutoffs mds in (34) and (35), we solve
simultaneously for the equilibrium wages and the upper bounds (ŵ′r, µ̂
max′
r ).
3. We use the computed values (ŵ′r, µ̂
max′
r ) to estimate the gravity equation (33) as follows:
ln
(
Xrs
LrLs
)
+ klnŵ′r − (k + 1)lnŵ
′
s − lnm
d
s + ln µ̂
max′
r
= −γk ln drs + γ(k + 1) ln drr − kθbrs + εrs,
which yields constrained estimates (γ̂′′, θ̂′′).
4. We iterate through steps 2 to 3 until convergence to obtain (γ̂, θ̂) and (ŵr, µ̂
max
r ).
Last, we have to deal with the fact that bilateral trade flows among the 40 regions for
which we have sufficient data are also affected by other out-of-sample regions and countries.
This concern is particularly relevant in the context of a counterfactual analysis, since the trade
creation and diversion effects of a hypothetical trade integration also feature general equilibrium
repercussions with other trading partners. Fortunately, our gravity equation system allows us
to take this issue into account, because we can include further regions and countries into the
equilibrium constraints (34)–(35), even if we lack bilateral trade flow data for these observations.
Specifically, our full data set includes K = 83 areas, namely the 10 Canadian provinces, all
50 US states plus the District of Columbia, the 21 OECD members in 1993, and Mexico.18 The
distance, population and cutoff data for the 43 areas out of the gravity sample are defined in an
analogous way as those for the areas in the gravity sample. For the rest of the world (ROW), we
use OECD data (including for Mexico) to construct observed wages and average productivities.
We use hourly wages and hours worked to construct the former, whereas the latter are obtained
by converting 1993 hourly labor productivity in national currency into yearly figures (using hours
worked) expressed in Canadian dollars.
In the iterative procedure, once we obtain initial unconstrained estimates for the structural
parameters (γ̂′, θ̂′) using only the 40 regions from the ‘in gravity sample’, we can solve (34) and
able ‘guess’ for the starting values and allow for faster convergence of the iterative procedure. We experimented
with different starting values and obtained the same estimates.
18See Tables 3 and 5 for the list of the 40 Canadian and US regions used in the gravity equation (‘in gravity
sample’) and for the 21 regions used only in the general equilibrium constraints (‘out of gravity sample’). Because
of their extremely small population sizes we have excluded Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut from the
analysis. The rest of the world consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, UK and Mexico, which together with Canada account for the lion’s share of US intra-
industry trade (and 66.5% of total US exports and 64.7% of total US imports in 1993).
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(35) for the wages and upper bounds (ŵ′r, µ̂
max′
r ) for the full sample of areas.
19 The solutions for
the 40 ‘in gravity’ regions, which are affected by the general equilibrium interactions among all
trading partners, are plugged back into (33) and the estimation proceeds as described above. The
resulting final estimates of trade frictions (γ̂, θ̂) and of wages and upper bounds (ŵr, µ̂
max
r ) for all
83 areas are consistent with theory as they take into account all the equilibrium information of
the model. Using this information we can then retrieve the fitted values of bilateral trade flows
X̂rs for all pairs of areas, even for those not in the gravity sample.
4.3 Estimation results
Our estimation results for the gravity equation system are summarized in Table 1. Column 1
presents the benchmark case with K = 83 areas and k = 9.5, whereas Columns 2-6 contain
alternative specifications used as robustness checks.
Insert Table 1 about here.
As can be seen from Column 1 in Table 1, all coefficients have the correct sign and are precisely
estimated. In our benchmark case, the estimated distance elasticity is −1.4195, which implies
that γ̂ = 0.1494. The border coefficient estimate is −1.5951, which implies that θ̂ = 0.1679.
Note that our estimated border coefficient is virtually identical to the one of −1.59 obtained by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). However, as shown later, the impacts of a border removal on
trade flows differ substantially once endogenous wages and firm selection are taken into account.
Columns 2-4 report results for different values of k. Column 5 presents results when we
use the alternative measure for internal distance as proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003). In that case, we exclude the ROW as this distance measure is not really appropriate
in an international context. Column 6 finally presents results obtained when we exclude the 49
zero trade flows in the sample. The coefficient of the border dummy varies only little across the
different specifications, which mostly display adjusted R2 values in excess of 0.9.
Last, as stated in the foregoing, we can get an additional idea of the goodness of fit of our
model by comparing the relative wages ŵr, obtained from the general equilibrium constraints,
with observed relative wages. In our benchmark case, the correlation is 0.62 when including the
ROW, and 0.76 when focusing only on Canadian provinces and US states. Thus, the predicted
relative wages match observed ones fairly well.
19Even when focusing on the 40 regions, we still have to deal with 49 zero trade flows out of 1600 observations.
Since there is no generally agreed-upon methodology to deal with this problem (see, e.g., Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2004; Disdier and Head, 2008), we include a dummy variable for zero flows in the regressions. Note
that our zeros are unlikely to be ‘true zeros’, as this would imply no aggregate manufacturing trade between
several US states (see Helpman et al. 2008 on the treatment of ‘true zeros’). As a robustness check, we estimate
the system by dropping the 49 zero flows.
18
5 Counterfactual analysis
Having estimated the gravity equation system, we now turn to a counterfactual analysis in the
spirit of Bernard et al. (2003) and Del Gatto et al. (2006) and investigate the potential impacts
of fully eliminating all trade distortions generated by the Canada-US border. This hypothetical
trade integration would induce various effects, both at the aggregated and at the disaggregated
level. We start with the analysis of how regional trade flows would change, and how key regional
economic aggregates such as wages, productivity, markups, as well as welfare would be affected.
Afterwards we turn to a firm-level analysis which traces out some consequences of this trade
integration for the productivity distributions, export sales distributions and export intensities.
5.1 The impacts on regional trade flows
To quantify the induced changes in regional trade flows we define bilateral border effects as the
ratio of trade flows from r to s in a borderless world to those in a world with borders:
Brs ≡
X˜rs
X̂rs
= ek
bθbrs
(
w˜s/w˜r
ŵs/ŵr
)k+1(
w˜r
ŵr
)(
m˜ds
mds
)k+1
, (37)
where variables with a tilde refer to values in a borderless world. The value of Brs can be
computed as follows. First, we use the estimated wages ŵr and the observed cutoffs m
d
s in the
presence of the border to obtain the relevant information for the initial fitted trade flows X̂rs
in (37). Second, holding the shape parameter k, the estimated upper bounds µ̂maxr , and trade
frictions (γ̂, θ̂) constant, we solve (34) and (35) by setting brs = 0 for all r and s. This yields
the wages w˜r and the cutoffs m˜
d
s that would prevail in a borderless world. Plugging these values
into (37), we obtain 61 × 61 = 3721 bilateral border effects, each of which gives the change in
the trade flows from r to s after the border removal.20
Insert Table 2 about here.
The bilateral border effects Brs are typically greater than one when regions r and s are in
different countries. The reason is that exports from region r to region s partly substitute for
domestic sales as international trade frictions are reduced. For analogous reasons, the values of
Brs are typically less than one when r and s are in the same country. Table 2 provides some
descriptive statistics on the series of computed bilateral border effects for the various specifi-
cations given in Table 1. One can see that the different specifications yield almost identically
distributed and strongly correlated bilateral border effects.
20Strictly speaking, we could compute 83× 83 bilateral border effects, but in the remainder of this paper we
concentrate on the effects of the hypothetical border removal for the 61 regions in Canada and in the US. We do
not report the induced changes of the border removal for the other countries, although the ROW is included in
the underlying general equilibrium constraints.
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5.1.1 Decomposing bilateral border effects
What drives bilateral border effects? As can be seen from expression (37), Brs can be decomposed
into four components: (i) a pure border effect ek
bθbrs; (ii) a relative wage effect ∆(ws/wr) ≡
[(w˜s/w˜r)/(ŵs/ŵr)]
k+1; (iii) an absolute wage effect ∆wr ≡ w˜r/ŵr; and (iv) a selection effect
∆mds ≡
(
m˜ds/m
d
s
)k+1
. Table 3 provides an example of this decomposition.
Insert Table 3 about here.
The left half of Table 3 lists the components of Brs for exports from British Columbia (BC)
to all Canadian provinces and US states. Consider, for example, the bilateral border effect with
Washington (WA). The pure border effect corresponds to the predicted change in bilateral trade
flows that would prevail if endogenous changes in wages and cutoffs were not taken into account.
In this example, it states that the value of exports from BC to WA would rise by a factor of
4.9290. Yet, the wage in BC rises relative to that in WA after the border removal, and BC firms
thus become less competitive in WA due to relatively higher production costs. This change is
captured by the relative wage effect which decreases the export value by some 40% in this case.
The absolute wage effect, on the contrary, raises BC exports by a factor of 1.0584 as the higher
wage is reflected in the higher prices. When taken together, these two wage effects reduce the
pure bilateral border effect from BC to WA by about 36.6% (as 0.5991 × 1.0584 = 0.6340).
Put differently, neglecting the endogenous reaction of wages to the border removal leads to
overstating the bilateral border effect by about 36.6%! Finally, there is a selection effect. The
border removal reduces the cutoff marginal labor requirement that firms need to match to survive
in WA. In other words, trade integration induces tougher selection and makes it harder for BC
firms to sell in WA. This selection effect decreases the export value by a factor of 0.8359, i.e., it
further reduces the bilateral border effect by 16.4%. Putting together the different components,
the bilateral border effect is then given by 4.9290 × 0.5991 × 1.0584 × 0.8359 = 2.6126, which
is almost half the size of the pure border effect without endogenous wage and productivity
responses.
Trade flows between regions within the same country would also be affected by the border
removal. Consider, for example, exports from BC to Ontario (ON). There is, of course, no pure
border effect for this intranational trade flow, but due to the endogenous changes in wages and
cutoffs we find a bilateral border effect equal to 1 × 0.9350 × 1.0584 × 0.3581 = 0.3544. The
border removal thus reduces the value of exports from BC to ON by almost 65%. Note that
wages in BC rise relative to those in ON, which provides BC firms with a cost disadvantage and
per se decreases exports to ON by around 6.5%. The main effect at work in this case, however,
is the tougher selection in ON due to the increased presence of more productive US firms. This
makes it much harder for BC firms to sell in ON and reduces the export value by more than
60%. The induced selection effects are also visible in the bilateral border effect of BC with itself.
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The value of local sales by BC firms drops by 67%, which is caused by the now much tougher
selection in that market.
The right half of Table 3 provides the Brs for exports from New York (NY) to all Canadian
provinces and US states. Consider, for example, exports from NY to Que´bec (QC), which would
rise by a factor of 4.9290 × 1.5166 × 1.0018 × 0.4277 = 3.2026. In this example wages in QC
rise relative to those in NY, which gives NY firms a relative cost advantage and per se boosts
export values, whereas the tougher selection in QC makes market penetration by NY firms more
difficult, which per se reduces export values. Exports from NY to California (CA) change little
after the border removal (1× 0.9776× 1.0018× 0.9870 = 0.9667). The explanation is that CA is
large and far away from the border, so that little additional selection is induced there, while the
wage in NY rises only slightly when compared to that in CA. On balance, these small changes
affect trade flows only marginally. There is also only a slight reduction of local sales of NY firms
(by about 3.4%) since the wage and the cutoff in NY are virtually unaffected by the relatively
small Canadian economy.
To sum up, these examples show that any computation of border effects should take into
account changes in wages and productivity. Neglecting these endogenous adjustments leads
to biased predictions for changes in international and intranational trade flows in a borderless
world, and that bias can be substantial.
5.1.2 Regional and national border effects
In his seminal work on border effects, McCallum (1995) finds that, conditional on regional GDP
and distance, trade between Canadian provinces exceeds by roughly 22 times trade between
Canadian provinces and US states. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that this estimate
is substantially upward biased due to the omission of general equilibrium constraints. They find
that, on average, the border increases trade between Canadian provinces ‘only’ by a factor of
10.7 when compared to trade with US states. The corresponding number for the US is 2.24.
What does our approach, which adds endogenous wages and firm selection to the analysis,
predict for the impact of the border removal on overall Canadian and US trade flows? To
evaluate this, we need to aggregate bilateral border effects first at the regional and then at the
national level. We define the regional border effect for Canadian province r as follows:
Br ≡
∑
s∈US X˜rs/
∑
s∈US X̂rs∑
s∈CA X˜rs/
∑
s∈CA X̂rs
=
∑
s∈US λ
US
rs Brs∑
s∈CA λ
CA
rs Brs
,
where λUSrs = X̂rs/
∑
s∈US X̂rs and λ
CA
rs = X̂rs/
∑
s∈CA X̂rs are the fitted trade shares. The
numerator is the trade weighted average of international bilateral border effects, whereas the
denominator is the trade weighted average of the intranational Brs. The regional border effects
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Br thus summarize by how much cross-border trade would rise as compared to domestic trade
for each Canadian province and US state. As can be seen from Column 2 in Table 4, regional
border effects are naturally larger for Canadian provinces than for US states. As can be further
seen, there is also some intranational variation, with border effects ranging from a low of 6.21
in Prince Edward Island to a high of 7.65 in Ontario for Canada; and from a low of 3.12 in
Washington to a high of 3.46 in Maine for the US.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Turning to the national level, it can be easily verified that the national border effect for
Canada can be simplified as follows:
BCA ≡
∑
r∈CA
∑
s∈US X˜rs/
∑
r∈CA
∑
s∈US X̂rs∑
r∈CA
∑
s∈CA X˜rs/
∑
r∈CA
∑
s∈CA X̂rs
=
1
KCA
∑
r∈CA
Br,
where KCA = 10 is the number of Canadian provinces. An analogous definition applies to the
US. Using this approach we obtain BCA = 6.8973 and BUS = 3.2767.
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Endogenous wages are crucial for explaining the difference between our results and those
of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The border removal breaks the zero expected profit
conditions in all regions. To recover zero expected profits, wages and productivity in Canada
must rise relatively to those in the US, as will be shown in more detail in the next subsection. In
a fixed-wage model such as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the measured Canadian border
effect is therefore overstated, because the export dampening effects of the higher relative wage
are not taken into account. The measured US border effect is understated for analogous reasons.
This may explain why Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) find more dissimilar national border
effects (10.7 for Canada and 2.24 for the US). The change in productivity also affects national
border effects. The border removal intensifies competition in all markets and, therefore, bilateral
border effects for all pairs of regions are reduced. A model that does not take such effects into
account will therefore incorrectly assess the magnitude of the impact of the border removal on
changes in regional trade flows.
21Strictly speaking, our definition of the national border effect differs slightly from that of Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003). When using their definition in terms of geometric means (see Feenstra, 2004), we obtain 6.88
for Canada and 3.28 for the US. The advantage of our definition is that it precisely measures the (multiplicative)
impact of the border removal on trade flows. Let us emphasize here that our primary objective is not to ‘downsize
the border effect’ but rather to understand how it is affected by endogenous wages and cutoffs. There are many
competing explanations for why measured border effects may be too large (see, e.g., Yi, 2009, for the impacts of
trade in intermediate goods).
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5.2 The impacts on key economic aggregates
We now investigate the predictions of our model on how trade integration affects other key
economic aggregates at the regional level. More specifically, we describe the impacts of the
border removal on wages, average productivity, average markups, the mass of varieties produced
and consumed, and welfare.
Insert Table 5 about here.
In Table 5, we report the predicted regional changes for these variables after the border
removal. It is clear that these endogenous changes must depend on the primitives of the model, in
particular the vector of 1993 regional populations, and the matrix of pre- and post border-removal
trade costs. Despite the fact that no explicit form can be obtained for the function that describes
how exogenous regional characteristics map into changes in endogenous variables, we can, by
using a simple OLS regression, approximate such a function by a linear relationship. Specifically,
we regress endogenous regional changes on two crucial regional characteristics: geography and
size. The former dimension is captured by the distance of region r to the closest foreign region,
and the latter by the population size Lr. This simple regression allows us to understand if
the border removal would mainly affect smaller regions and/or regions closer to the border.
Furthermore, we investigate if regional changes differ systematically between Canada and the
US by including a dummy for Canada. Table 6 reports the results. Note that the R2 values
consistently exceed 0.84, regardless of the specification and of the dependent variable. This
suggests that our simple regression approach is in fact very useful for understanding the variation
of the implied regional changes.22
Starting with the wage changes (listed in Column 1 of Table 5), the first estimated specifica-
tion reveals (top part of Column 1 in Table 6) that the border removal favors wage convergence
between the two countries. Pre-border wages in Canada are in fact lower than those in the US
while the Canada dummy is positive, sizeable, and highly significant. As the gains from better
market access are much larger for the Canadian provinces, wages generally rise relative to those
in US states.23 For Canadian provinces the wage changes range from 1.78% for Prince Edward
Island to 5.84% for British Columbia, whereas those in the US are much smaller and can go
either way. Investigating the overall variation of these changes, we find that regions further
22One could consider adding technology (local technological possibilities) as a third regional characteristic,
which would be captured by 1/µ̂maxr . Recall, however, that µ̂
max
r has been computed from the general equilibrium
constraints, and may therefore not be strictly exogenous (in an econometric sense) to the predicted regional
changes. Furthermore, when using 1/µ̂maxr in the regressions we always obtain an insignificant coefficient for this
variable, while the R2 value does not improve. We hence drop it in what follows.
23This result is in line with result (v) derived analytically in our simple two-region setting in Section 3.4. Note
that all wages are expressed relative to that in Alabama, which we set to one by choice of nume´raire.
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away from the border tend to experience smaller wage increases (the elasticity being −0.4323)
and that there is no significant relationship with population size. These findings are likely to be
driven by the fact that the 10 Canadian provinces experience the largest increases but display
little variation in their distance to the border and in their size (at least when compared to US
states). In a second specification (middle part of Column 1 in Table 6) we therefore consider
interaction terms of our proxies for geography and size with a US-dummy, and focus interpreta-
tion on US states. Within the US, regions closer to the border also have stronger wage increases,
but the elasticity is a bit smaller than before (−1.0115 + 0.7734 = −0.2381). This is consistent
with the fact that for the US, being initially the much larger market, proximity to the new
market opportunities matters less than for Canada. This second specification further shows that
wage increases are stronger in smaller US states, thus favoring wage convergence across states
(the elasticity with respect to size is 0.6001− 0.6749 = −0.0748). Finally, we explore whether
geography or size contribute more to explaining regional variation in wage changes across the
US. To do so we report (bottom part of Column 1 in Table 6) beta coefficients obtained from
the second specification.24 The beta coefficients reveal that distance to the border is the more
important determinant of regional wage changes. In fact, this measure of geography is almost
twice as important as that of size.
Insert Table 6 about here.
Looking at other endogenous changes reveals a similar pattern. Predicted cutoff changes are
negative for all Canadian provinces and US states, which shows that removing the border induces
tougher selection and increases average productivity.25 The average productivity gain in Canada
would be 5.71%, whereas in the US it is much smaller (0.3%). Clearly, since Canada is the smaller
economy with less selection prior to the border removal, trade integration has more substantial
consequences there. Still, across US states we find stronger productivity gains in smaller regions
and in regions closer to the border, with geography adding more to the understanding of the
regional variation than size. Average markups fall in all regions, but the reductions in Canada
(where markups fall between 1.78% and 5.19%) are more substantial than in the US (0.12%
to 1.08%). As we show in the next subsection, these pro-competitive effects arise because the
border removal increases the share of firms engaged in cross-border transactions. More firms
compete in each market after the border removal, which puts downward pressure on markups.
Last, we find that the number of firms decreases everywhere due to tougher selection, but this
exit is smaller than the increase in imported varieties so that consumption diversity expands in
24The value of −0.3390 for the beta coefficient on size means that a one standard deviation increase of regional
size lowers the regional wage increase after the border removal by 33.90%.
25Quite naturally, the hypothetical border removal between Canada and the US hurts the ROW countries, who
see their cutoffs marginally increase (results not reported here).
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all Canadian provinces and US states.
To see that tougher selection or more diversity in consumption map into welfare gains, notice
that since e−αqsr(m) = psr(m)/p
d
r by (14), the indirect utility in region r is given by
Ur =
∑
s
NEs
∫ mxsr
0
[
1− e−αqsr(m)
]
dGs(m) = N
c
r
(
1−
pr
pdr
)
.
Using expression (17), one can verify that pr = [k/(k + 1)]p
d
r + αwr/N
c
r , which allows us to
express the indirect utility as Ur = N
c
r/(k + 1)− α/(τrrm
d
r). Since N
c
r is defined as in (20), and
making use of the fact that expression (27) holds in equilibrium, we can rewrite the indirect
utility as follows:
Ur =
[
1
(k + 1)κ3
− 1
]
α
τrrmdr
. (38)
Hence, welfare is inversely proportional to the cutoff mdr . Alternatively, the equilibrium utility
can be written as Ur = [1/(k + 1) − κ3]N
c
r ., i.e., welfare changes in region r are proportional
to changes in the mass of varieties available for consumption.26 These effects are again more
pronounced in Canada than in the US, and welfare gains in the US are strongest in small regions
close to the border.
5.3 Firm-level analysis
In the foregoing section, we examined the impacts of trade integration at the regional level.
Though fundamental for our understanding of the mechanisms at work, this approach does
not provide enough insights on firm-level issues. We hence now investigate the impacts of our
counterfactual trade liberalization scenario on firms’ productivity distributions, their export sales
distributions, and their export intensities. To this end, we generate two sets of random samples
of 110,000 firms: 10,000 Canadian and 100,000 US firms, before and after removing the border.
To make the samples representative, we draw firms in each region both before and after removing
the border in proportion to its share of surviving firms (see Appendix D for additional details).
We first use the generated samples to calibrate the shape parameter k of the Pareto distribution.
We compute for each firm its ‘empirical’ productivity (based on revenue instead of the usually
unavailable physical output). Our sample of Canadian exporters before removing the border
delivers a revenue-based productivity advantage of exporters over non-exporters of 20.28%. The
corresponding productivity advantage for US exporters in the presence of the border is 32.5%,
26Removing the border decreases all the domestic cutoffs, thus reducing domestic consumption diversity, yet
increases all export cutoffs, thereby raising import consumption diversity. The net effect is to expand con-
sumers’ choice sets everywhere, which maps into welfare gains. Note that, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), we
report cardinal percentage changes in welfare. These figures are therefore sensitive to a monotonically increasing
transformation of the utility function.
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which matches the 33% advantage computed by Bernard et al. (2003) from 1992 US Census of
Manufactures data. This vindicates our choice of k = 9.5.
Our Canadian sample delivers a share of exporters of about 7.08% before removing the
border. The corresponding figure for the US is 1.95%. These are quite small numbers which
convey the message that exporting firms are rare in the economy. Note that the US figure fits
decently with the one reported by Bernard et al. (2009), who document that only 2.6% of all
US firms reported exporting anything at all in 1993.27
5.3.1 Productivity distribution by export status and export sales distribution
Figure 1 depicts the (kernel-smoothed) density distributions of productivity 1/m for both ex-
porters and non-exporters in Canada (left panel) and in the US (right panel) before the border
removal.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
It should firstly be noted that the national productivity distributions of producers in our
sample are clearly not Pareto, although all the underlying regional distributions are.28 This
results from the aggregation of heterogeneous regions, more specifically because of the positive
relationship among size, productivity, and entry: smaller regions have in general higher cutoffs
(less productive firms), and also fewer firms. Adding increasingly big regions with more produc-
tive firms to the national distribution then generates the initially upward sloping part. Secondly,
as can be seen, exporters’ productivity distribution lies to the right of the analogous distribution
for domestic firms. This shows that high productivity firms, in general, tend to operate in export
markets. However, there is some sizeable overlap in the two distributions, especially in the US
case. The reasons for this overlap are regional heterogeneity in wages and market access, which
implies that a firm with a draw 1/m may be an exporter in some regions, but not in others.
Put differently, regional characteristics matter for the export status of a firm.29 This applies
more to the US as firms there face more heterogeneity in terms of accessibility to the Canadian
market than the other way round. As can also be seen from Figure 1, both the Canadian and
27The share of exporters in a US state is defined as the share of firms selling to at least one Canadian province
or one country in the ROW. Formally, it is given by Gr(maxs∈CA,ROW{m
x
rs})/Gr(maxs{m
x
rs}). The share
of US exporters is then computed as the weighted average of the states’ exporter shares, where the weights are
proportional to the mass of surviving firms in each state (see Appendix D). All figures for the Canadian provinces
are computed in an analogous way.
28The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test strongly rejects the null of a Pareto for both Canada and the US.
29It has been recognized that national distributions of exporters and domestic firms overlap even within nar-
rowly defined industries. Eaton et al. (2009) introduce random firm-and-destination specific shocks to both
demand and market entry costs to account for this overlap. As shown by our results, considerations related to
wage differentials and the geography of trading partners are also able to cope with this feature.
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the US distributions are quite ‘spiky’, which also stems from the regional heterogeneity that is
aggregated into the overall distributions.
Insert Table 7 about here.
Table 7 shows that both in Canada and in the US, the large bulk of exporters sells little
to nothing in the export markets, whereas a few firms have much higher export intensity and
export sales. In Canada, export intensities of some firms exceed 90% (but fall short of 100%),
whereas the US figures are lower, with the largest sellers earning slightly less than 70% of
their revenue from exports. These different export intensities do, of course, reflect the size
asymmetries between the two countries and the relative importance of the international market
for their economies. As can also be seen from the top half of Table 7, our model can partly
replicate the skewness of the empirical distribution of export intensities. The bottom half of
Table 7 shows that our model delivers export sales distributions that are skewed towards the
most productive firms. Although our model cannot replicate the amazing degree of skewness
observed in the US distribution, as reported by Bernard et al. (2009) using 1993 US firm-level
data, we still find that the top 25% of exporters account for about 92.65% of total US export
sales, whereas the top 50% of exporters account for almost 98% of all export sales. The Canadian
figures are of roughly similar magnitude.
5.3.2 Impacts of removing the border
Finally, we single out three important firm-level impacts of removing the border. First, as
expected, the share of exporters increases substantially. The exporter share in Canada after
the border removal is 33.51%, whereas the corresponding figure for the US is 5.89%. Clearly,
removing the border increases the share of firms engaged in cross-border business by lowering
trade frictions between the two countries. Furthermore, the productivity advantage of exporters
shrinks to 9.53% for Canadian firms and to 21.56% for US firms.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Second, trade liberalization affects the productivity distributions in both countries. Figure 2
depicts the (kernel smoothed) productivity density distributions of producers (top panel) and
sellers (bottom panel) in both Canada (left panel) and in the US (right panel) before and
after the border removal. Note that although selection works as a simple left-truncation of the
productivity density in all regions, the observed country-wise effects are more complex. In fact,
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null that the pre- and post border-removal distributions
(for both Canada and the US) are a truncated version of each other. Also note from the bottom
panel of Figure 2 that the productivity distribution of the firms selling in the Canadian market
radically changes as the border is removed. The least productive Canadian firms go out of
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business, whereas the distribution of the surviving sellers shifts to the right in a non-trivial
way. The US distribution barely changes. There is indeed some right-shift in the productivity
distribution of surviving firms in the US, but that shift is very small. The reason is that Canadian
firms are on average less productive and fewer in numbers, which implies that their entry into
the US market will not spark substantial churning and market share reallocations across firms.
Third, trade liberalization affects export intensities and polarization. As can be seen from
the bottom half of Table 7, removing the border slightly decreases the polarization of export
sales of Canadian firms, whereas that of the most productive US firms increases. Firms’ export
intensities increase in both countries. Interestingly, some low productivity firms from British
Columbia and Que´bec now earn a full 100% of revenue from exports. These firms can export
to some US states in a borderless world, whereas they cannot sell anymore in their domestic
market because of higher wages and increased competition. The border removal leads to wage
convergence between Canada and the US (see above) but Canadian wages are still lower than
in the US. As the firms from BC and QC substantially benefit from lower trade frictions, they
now find it profitable to enter the high wage US market where they have a cost advantage.
These less efficient Canadian sellers show up on the left-side of the productivity distribution of
surviving firms in the US.30 Such an effect can only be captured in a model featuring factor price
differences that allow less productive firms to penetrate the export market and survive there.
6 Conclusions
We have developed a new and highly tractable trade model with monopolistic competition and
heterogeneous firms. In contrast to previous contributions, it features variable demand elasticity
and endogenous price-cost margins in a full-fledged general equilibrium setup with multiple
asymmetric regions. Both wages and productivity are endogenous, need not be equalized across
regions, and respond to trade integration. Given these properties, our framework provides
a basis for empirical work and counterfactual analysis. To illustrate this, we have derived a
gravity equation system and structurally estimated its parameters from 1993 regional trade data.
Although our iterative procedure requires some customized programming, it has the advantage of
yielding estimates that take into account all general equilibrium effects of the model. Contrary to
the simpler fixed effects approach to gravity, we can take into account the endogenous responses
of key regional variables when conducting policy experiments.
We have focused on one such counterfactual analysis and simulated the regional and firm-level
effects of removing all trade distortions generated by the Canada-US border. The first message
30Although barely visible from the bottom right panel of Figure 2 due to the scaling, there is indeed entry of
low productivity sellers in the US after removing the border.
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from this simulation exercise is that endogenous wage and productivity responses are crucial for
understanding the effects of trade integration: ignoring endogenous wages and selection effects
systematically biases all bilateral border effects as well as the national border effects for Canada
and the US. Our counterfactual analysis also reveals that the border removal would lead to non-
negligible aggregate productivity gains, lower average markups, greater consumption diversity,
and higher welfare in all provinces and states, but particularly so in Canada. Within the US
there is substantial regional variation due to geography and size: smaller states closer to the
border would gain more.
The second message is that our framework can replicate several stylized facts from firm-
level studies in international trade, and that it can shed new light on some recent issues from
that literature. Using a generated firm sample drawn from the estimated aggregate model,
we have shown that the export sales and the export intensity distributions delivered by our
model fit reasonably well with the empirical facts. Furthermore, the internal geography of
countries provides a simple explanation for the observed overlap of domestic firms’ and exporters’
productivity distributions. Finally, we have found that at the country level there is no simple
relationship between trade integration and its impact on the productivity distribution of firms.
While trade integration leads to a simple left-truncation at the regional level, the aggregate
implications at the national level are more complex.
To conclude, observe that our model allows for many extensions and alternative counter-
factuals. A first extension would be to endogenize regional populations by taking into account
interregional and international migration, which would nicely fit with our focus on North Amer-
ica. Taking this road would, as a by-product, partly bridge the gap between trade models with
heterogeneous firms and the ‘new economic geography’ literature. A second extension would be
to switch to a broader international setting including North-South trade. Given the absence of
FPE, our model should be especially useful for this exercise once extended to cope with differ-
ential factor proportions and the presence of intermediate inputs. A third possible extension
would be to show how revenue-based productivity depends upon firms’ location, the wages they
pay and the spatial structure of the demand they face. This may seem worthwhile since it has
been recently emphasized that selection is likely to occur on profitability instead of narrowly
defined physical productivity (Foster et al., 2008). Locational heterogeneity matters in explain-
ing firm selection and export status in our model because firms face different wages and have
different market access depending on which region they are located in. A preliminary analysis
using our generated sample of US firms and simple OLS regression reveals that idiosyncratic
locational components explain about 13% of the variation of revenue-based firm productivity,
whereas physical productivity accounts for the remaining 87%. This finding again emphasizes
that location matters, and certainly calls for further research.
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Appendix A: Proofs and computations
A.1. Derivation of (8) and properties of W . Using pd = mdw, the first-order conditions
(6) can be rewritten as
ln
[
mdw
p(m)
]
= 1−
mw
p(m)
.
Taking the exponential of both sides and rearranging terms, we have
e
m
md
=
mw
p(m)
e
mw
p(m) .
Noting that the Lambert W function is defined as ϕ = W (ϕ)eW (ϕ) and setting ϕ = em/md, we
obtain W (em/md) = mw/p(m), which implies p(m) as given in (8). The derivations of q(m)
and pi(m) then follow straightforwardly.
Turning to the properties of the Lambert W function, we clearly see that ϕ = W (ϕ)eW (ϕ)
implies that W (ϕ) ≥ 0 for all ϕ ≥ 0. Taking logarithms on both sides and differentiating yield
W ′(ϕ) =
W (ϕ)
ϕ[W (ϕ) + 1]
> 0
for all ϕ > 0. Finally, we have 0 = W (0)eW (0), which implies W (0) = 0; and e = W (e)eW (e),
which implies W (e) = 1.
A.2. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium cutoff md. We show that there exists
a unique equilibrium cutoff md. To see this, apply the Leibnitz integral rule to the left-hand
side of (10) and use W (e) = 1 to obtain
eL
α(md)2
∫ md
0
m2
(
W−2 − 1
)
W ′dG(m) > 0,
where the sign comes from W ′ > 0 and W−2 ≥ 1 for 0 ≤ m ≤ md. Hence, the left-hand side of
(10) is strictly increasing. This uniquely determines the equilibrium cutoff md, because
lim
md→0
∫ md
0
m
(
W−1 +W − 2
)
dG(m) = 0 and lim
md→∞
∫ md
0
m
(
W−1 +W − 2
)
dG(m) =∞.
A.3. Market size, the equilibrium cutoff, and the mass of entrants. Differentiating
(10) and using the Leibniz integral rule, we readily obtain
∂md
∂L
= −
αF
(
md
)2
eL2
[∫ md
0
m2
(
W−2 − 1
)
W ′dG(m)
]−1
< 0,
because W ′ > 0 and W−2 ≥ 1 for 0 ≤ m ≤ md. Differentiating (12) with respect to L yields
∂NE
∂L
=
F (NE)2
L2
{
1−
eL3
αF (md)2
[∫ md
0
m2W ′dG(m)
]
∂md
∂L
}
> 0,
where the sign comes from ∂md/∂L < 0 as established in the foregoing.
33
A.4. Existence and uniqueness in the two-region case. Under our assumptions on trade
costs, the RHS of (32) is non-negative if and only if ω < ω < ω, where ω ≡ ρ1/(k+1) (τ22/τ12)
k/(k+1)
and ω ≡ ρ1/(k+1) (τ21/τ11)
k/(k+1). Furthermore, the RHS is strictly decreasing in ω ∈ (ω, ω)
with limω→ω+RHS = ∞ and limω→ω−RHS = 0. The LHS of (32) is, on the contrary, strictly
increasing in ω ∈ (0,∞). Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium ω∗ ∈ (ω, ω).
A.5. Comparative statics. (i) Assume that ρ = 1, τ12 = τ21 = τ , and τ11 = τ22 = t.
The equilibrium relative wage ω∗ is increasing in L1/L2 as an increase in L1/L2 raises the RHS
of (32) without affecting the LHS. This implies that if the two regions have equal technological
possibilities and face symmetric trade costs, the larger region has the higher relative wage. Using
(30), one can verify that ω2k+1 =
(
md2/m
d
1
)k+1
holds in that case. As L1 > L2 implies ω > 1, it
directly follows that md1 < m
d
2. Finally, we show in (38) that a lower cutoff maps into a higher
welfare. Hence, the larger region has the higher welfare.
(ii) Assume that L1 = L2, τ12 = τ21 = τ , and τ11 = τ22 = t. Since t < τ holds, the RHS of
(32) shifts up as ρ increases, which then also increases ω∗. This implies that if the two regions are
of equal size and face symmetric trade costs, the region with the better technological possibilities
has the higher wage. Furthermore, evaluate (32) at ω = ρ1/(k+1). The LHS is equal to ρk/(k+1),
which falls short of the RHS given by ρ (since ρ > 1 and k ≥ 1). Since the LHS is increasing
and the RHS is decreasing, it must be that ω∗ > ρ1/(k+1). It is then straightforward to see that
md1 < m
d
2, because we can rewrite (30) as ω
2k+1/ρ =
(
md2/m
d
1
)k+1
and the LHS of this expression
must be larger than one since (ω∗)2k+1 > (ω∗)k+1 > ρ. By (38), U1 > U2 follows again.
(iii) Assume that ρ = 1, L1 = L2 and τ12 = τ21 = τ . Higher internal trade costs in one region
reduce the relative wage of that region, because we can verify from (32) that
∂(RHS)
∂τ11
< 0 iff ω∗ > ω and
∂(RHS)
∂τ22
> 0 iff ω∗ < ω,
where the bounds ω and ω are given in Appendix A.4. Since ω2k+1 =
(
md2/m
d
1
)k+1
, it follows
that the region with the lower internal trade costs also has the lower cutoff and, thus, by (38)
the higher welfare.
(iv) Assume that ρ = 1, L1 = L2 and τ11 = τ22 = t. Better access to the foreign market
raises the domestic relative wage, whereas better access from the foreign to the domestic market
reduces the domestic relative wage because (32) implies
∂(RHS)
∂τ12
< 0 iff ω∗ < ω and
∂(RHS)
∂τ21
> 0 iff ω∗ > ω.
Since ω2k+1 =
(
md2/m
d
1
)k+1
holds, it follows that the region that ends up with the higher wage
also ends up with the lower cutoff and, thus, with higher welfare.
34
(v) Finally, assuming that τ12 = τ21 = τ and that τ11 = τ22 = t, one can verify that
∂(RHS)
∂τ
= −
kρtk
τk+1
L1
L2
ρ2 − ω2(k+1)
[ωk+1 − ρ(t/τ)k]2

>
=
<
 0 for

ω < ρ
1
k+1 < ω∗ < ω
ω < ω∗ = ρ
1
k+1 < ω
ω < ω∗ < ρ
1
k+1 < ω
 . (39)
Note that when regions are of equal size, but have different upper bounds (ρ > 1), the first
case of (39) applies since ω∗ > ρ1/(k+1) as shown in (ii). Hence, lower trade costs reduce the
relative wage of the more productive region. Furthermore, when regions have the same upper
bounds but different sizes (L1 > L2), we obtain ω
∗ > ρk/(k+1) = 1, so that the first case of (39)
applies again. In other words, when regions differ in size or technological possiblities, wages
converge as bilateral trade barriers fall. Since ω2k+1 = ρ
(
md2/m
d
1
)k+1
always holds, this wage
convergence directly implies (conditional) convergence of the regional cutoff productivities, and
thus (conditional) convergence of regional welfare.
Appendix B: Integrals involving the Lambert W function
To derive closed-form solutions for various expressions throughout the paper we need to compute
integrals involving the Lambert W function. This can be done by using the change in variables
suggested by Corless et al. (1996, p.341). Let
z ≡W
(
e
m
I
)
, so that e
m
I
= zez , where I = mdr , m
x
rs,
where subscript r can be dropped in the closed economy. The change in variables then yields
dm = (1+ z)ez−1Idz, with the new integration bounds given by 0 and 1. Under our assumption
of a Pareto distribution for productivity draws, the change in variables allows to rewrite integrals
in simplified form.
B.1. First, consider the following expression, which appears when integrating firms’ outputs:∫ I
0
m
[
1−W
(
e
m
I
)]
dGr(m) = κ1 (m
max
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ1 ≡ ke
−(k+1)
∫ 1
0
(1 − z2) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends on the
shape parameter k.
B.2. Second, the following expression appears when integrating firms’ operating profits:∫ I
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
I
)−1
+W
(
e
m
I
)
− 2
]
dGr(m) = κ2 (m
max
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ2 ≡ ke
−(k+1)
∫ 1
0
(1 + z) (z−1 + z − 2) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is also a constant term which solely
depends on the shape parameter k.
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B.3. Finally, the following expression appears when integrating firms’ revenues:∫ I
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
I
)−1
− 1
]
dGr(m) = κ3 (m
max
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ3 ≡ ke
−(1+k)
∫ 1
0
(z−1 − z) (zez)k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends on the
shape parameter k. Using the expressions for κ1 and κ2, one can verify that κ3 = κ1 + κ2.
Appendix C: Equilibrium in the open economy
In this appendix we restate the open economy equilibrium conditions of Section 3 using the
Lambert W function.
C.1. Using (19), the labor market clearing condition can be rewritten as follows:
NEr
{
1
α
∑
s
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
m
[
1−W
(
e
m
mxrs
)]
dGr(m) + Fr
}
= Lr. (40)
C.2. Plugging (19) into (21), zero expected profits require that
1
α
∑
s
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
mxrs
)−1
+W
(
e
m
mxrs
)
− 2
]
dGr(m) = Fr. (41)
As in the closed economy case, the zero expected profit condition depends solely on the cutoffs
mxrs and is independent of the mass of entrants.
C.3. Finally, the trade balance condition is given by
NEr wr
∑
s 6=r
Lsτrs
∫ mxrs
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
mxrs
)−1
− 1
]
dGr(m)
= Lr
∑
s 6=r
NEs τsrws
∫ mxsr
0
m
[
W
(
e
m
mxsr
)−1
− 1
]
dGs(m). (42)
Applying the region-specific Pareto distributions Gr(m) = (m/m
max
r )
k to (40)–(42) yields, after
some algebra and using the results of Appendix B, expressions (23)–(25) given in the main text.
Appendix D: Firm-level simulation procedure
To simulate our model at the firm-level, we use the estimates from the gravity equation system:
the relative wages (ŵr), the upper bound transforms (µ̂
max
r ), and the trade friction parameters
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(θ̂ and γ̂). These estimates provide all the information required to construct the domestic and
the export cutoffs in the economy (m̂ds and m̂
x
rs). Note that even though we have no information
on the preference parameter α and the region-specific entry costs Fr, we can still generate all
relevant firm-level variables that we require for our analysis. Let χ̂rs = 1 if m < m̂
x
rs (the firm
is productive enough to export to market s when it is established in market r) and χ̂rs = 0
otherwise. For each firm with productivity m drawn in region r of country I = CA,US, we can
compute the following firm-level quantities:
Export intensity. A firm’s export intensity is defined as
expintr(m) =
expslsr(m)
domslsr(m) + expslsr(m)
,
where total domestic sales and total export sales are respectively given by
domslsr(m) =
∑
s∈I
χ̂rsLsprs(m)qrs(m)
=
ŵrm
α
∑
s∈I
χ̂rsLsd
bγ
rs[W (em/m̂
x
rs)
−1 − 1]
expslsr(m) =
∑
s/∈I
χ̂rsLsprs(m)qrs(m)
=
ŵrm
α
∑
s/∈I
χ̂rsLsd
bγ
rse
bθbrs[W (em/m̂xrs)
−1 − 1].
Note that we can identify domestic sales and export sales up to a scaling parameter only (which
depends on the unobservable α), but that this is immaterial for the firm’s export intensity.
Revenue-based productivity. The revenue-based productivity, excluding the labor used for
shipping goods, is given by:
rbprodr(m) =
domslsr(m) + expslsr(m)
(m/α)
∑
s χ̂rsLs(1−W (em/m̂
x
rs))
,
which is again independent of the scaling by α.
To calibrate the value of k and to obtain the productivity (both physical and revenue-based)
and export intensity distributions, we generate two distinct samples of 110,000 firms each: one
with the border, and one after removing the border (setting brs = 0 for all r, s). Comparing
the two samples allows us to assess the distributional impacts of removing the border. To make
the sample representative, we draw firms in all regions in proportion to that region’s share of
surviving firms in the national number of surviving firms. We know that
Npr = N
E
r Gr
(
max
s
mxrs
)
=
α
κ1 + κ2
Lr (µ
max
r )
−1
(
max
s
mxrs
)k
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so that each region’s share of surviving firms in country I = CA,US is given by
θ̂r =
N̂pr∑
s∈I N̂
p
s
=
Lr (µ̂
max
r )
−1 (maxj m̂xrj)k∑
s∈I Ls (µ̂
max
s )
−1 (maxj m̂xsj)k , r ∈ I.
Note that the foregoing expression is again independent of the unobservable parameter α. For
a sample size NCA = 10, 000 and NUS = 100, 000, we randomly draw int(θ̂sNCA) firms for each
Canadian province and int(θ̂rNUS) firms for each US state from the region-specific productivity
distribution, where int(·) stands for the integer part. This yields a representative sample for
each country, while the overall sample respects country’s relative sizes in 1993.
For the counterfactual case after the border removal, we proceed in the same way except
that we use the simulated values m˜xrs for the various cutoffs. This yields counterfactual shares
θ˜r which ensure that we still draw a representative firm sample for the scenario after the border
removal. Note that we can keep the same overall sample size because all compositional changes
due to trade integration are reflected by the new regional sample shares.
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Table 1: Estimation of the gravity equation system
Benchmark(1) Robustness(2) Robustness(3) Robustness(4) Robustness(5) Robustness(6)
Regions 83 (40) 83 (40) 83 (40) 83 (40) 61 (40) 83 (40)
Flows 1560 1560 1560 1560 1560 1511
k 9.5 3.6 8.5 10.5 9.5 9.5
Internal dist. Surface Surface Surface Surface AvW Surface
Coefficients:
constant −4.2587 −4.1479 −4.2543 −4.2619 −4.4673 −4.2028
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln drs −1.4195 −1.5380 −1.4266 −1.4140 −1.1935 −1.4383
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lndrr 1.5690 1.9652 1.5944 1.5487 1.3191 1.5897
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
brs −1.5951 −1.5803 −1.5957 −1.5945 −1.6773 −1.6927
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
0− dummy −17.471 −17.546 −17.477 −17.466 −17.737 —
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) —
Adjusted R2 0.9108 0.9076 0.9105 0.9108 0.8917 0.6828
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Benchmark(1) uses 1560 trade flows, excluding intraregional flows Xrr as in Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003). ‘Surface’ refers to Redding and Venables’ (2004) surface-based measure of internal distance,
whereas AvW refers to Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) measure. The convergence criterion for the iterative
procedure is based on the difference of norms of the vector of regression coefficients between two successive iterations,
with threshold 10−12. Starting points for the iterative solver are obtained by OLS with importer-exporter fixed effects.
We choose wAlabama = 1 as nume´raire and set starting wages to wr = 1 for all r. Results are invariant to that choice.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for bilateral border effect series
Descriptive statistics for bilateral border effect series:
Benchmark(1) Robustness(2) Robustness(3) Robustness(4) Robustness(5) Robustness(6)
Minimum 0.3334 0.3504 0.3350 0.3322 0.3635 0.3332
Maximum 4.1121 4.3742 4.1381 4.0907 4.3323 4.1501
Mean 1.3144 1.3415 1.3171 1.3122 1.6642 1.3184
Std. dev. 0.9123 0.9594 0.9176 0.9079 1.2136 0.9216
Median 0.9772 0.9818 0.9774 0.9770 0.9624 0.9773
Skewness 2.0742 2.1059 2.0763 2.0725 1.0839 2.0775
Kurtosis 5.6195 5.7628 5.6278 5.6131 2.3343 5.6327
Correlation matrix for bilateral border effect series:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) 1 0.9997 1.0000 1.0000 0.9601 1.0000
(2) 1 0.9997 0.9997 0.9543 0.9997
(3) 1 1.0000 0.9598 1.0000
(4) 1 0.9603 0.9597
(5) 1 1.0000
(6) 1
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Table 3: Bilateral border effects decomposition for the province of British Columbia
and the state of New York
Benchmark(1), k = 9.5
Exporter: British Columbia Exporter: New York
Pure border Rel. wage Abs. wage Selection Bil. border Pure border Rel. wage Abs. wage Selection Bil. border
e
bθbrs ∆(ws/wr) ∆wr ∆m
d
s Brs e
bθbrs ∆(ws/wr) ∆wr ∆m
d
s Brs
Importer: In Gravity sample
Alberta 1.0000 0.7102 1.0584 0.6046 0.4545 4.9290 1.2644 1.0018 0.6046 3.7752
British Columbia 1.0000 1.0000 1.0584 0.3151 0.3334 4.9290 1.7805 1.0018 0.3151 2.7699
Manitoba 1.0000 0.8963 1.0584 0.3881 0.3682 4.9290 1.5958 1.0018 0.3881 3.0583
New Brunswick 1.0000 0.7188 1.0584 0.5909 0.4496 4.9290 1.2798 1.0018 0.5909 3.7343
Newfoundland 1.0000 0.7099 1.0584 0.6052 0.4547 4.9290 1.2639 1.0018 0.6052 3.7768
Nova Scotia 1.0000 0.6816 1.0584 0.6538 0.4717 4.9290 1.2136 1.0018 0.6538 3.9181
Ontario 1.0000 0.9350 1.0584 0.3581 0.3544 4.9290 1.6648 1.0018 0.3581 2.9435
Prince Edward Island 1.0000 0.6637 1.0584 0.6878 0.4831 4.9290 1.1818 1.0018 0.6878 4.0134
Quebec 1.0000 0.8518 1.0584 0.4277 0.3855 4.9290 1.5166 1.0018 0.4277 3.2026
Saskatchewan 1.0000 0.8337 1.0584 0.4455 0.3931 4.9290 1.4843 1.0018 0.4455 3.2655
Alabama 4.9290 0.5511 1.0584 0.9801 2.8178 1.0000 0.9812 1.0018 0.9801 0.9634
Arizona 4.9290 0.5527 1.0584 0.9747 2.8104 1.0000 0.9841 1.0018 0.9747 0.9609
California 4.9290 0.5491 1.0584 0.9870 2.8273 1.0000 0.9776 1.0018 0.9870 0.9667
Florida 4.9290 0.5491 1.0584 0.9868 2.8269 1.0000 0.9777 1.0018 0.9868 0.9666
Georgia 4.9290 0.5513 1.0584 0.9793 2.8167 1.0000 0.9816 1.0018 0.9793 0.9631
Idaho 4.9290 0.5670 1.0584 0.9283 2.7460 1.0000 1.0096 1.0018 0.9283 0.9389
Illinois 4.9290 0.5517 1.0584 0.9781 2.8151 1.0000 0.9823 1.0018 0.9781 0.9625
Indiana 4.9290 0.5550 1.0584 0.9671 2.7999 1.0000 0.9882 1.0018 0.9671 0.9573
Kentucky 4.9290 0.5552 1.0584 0.9664 2.7990 1.0000 0.9885 1.0018 0.9664 0.9570
Louisiana 4.9290 0.5501 1.0584 0.9837 2.8226 1.0000 0.9794 1.0018 0.9837 0.9651
Maine 4.9290 0.6113 1.0584 0.8045 2.5656 1.0000 1.0884 1.0018 0.8045 0.8772
Maryland 4.9290 0.5531 1.0584 0.9734 2.8086 1.0000 0.9848 1.0018 0.9734 0.9603
Massachusetts 4.9290 0.5561 1.0584 0.9635 2.7951 1.0000 0.9901 1.0018 0.9635 0.9557
Michigan 4.9290 0.5657 1.0584 0.9326 2.7520 1.0000 1.0072 1.0018 0.9326 0.9410
Minnesota 4.9290 0.5610 1.0584 0.9473 2.7726 1.0000 0.9989 1.0018 0.9473 0.9480
Missouri 4.9290 0.5529 1.0584 0.9740 2.8094 1.0000 0.9845 1.0018 0.9740 0.9606
Montana 4.9290 0.5872 1.0584 0.8684 2.6605 1.0000 1.0456 1.0018 0.8684 0.9096
New Hampshire 4.9290 0.5709 1.0584 0.9165 2.7294 1.0000 1.0164 1.0018 0.9165 0.9332
New Jersey 4.9290 0.5524 1.0584 0.9758 2.8119 1.0000 0.9835 1.0018 0.9758 0.9614
New York 4.9290 0.5616 1.0584 0.9454 2.7699 1.0000 1.0000 1.0018 0.9454 0.9471
North Carolina 4.9290 0.5541 1.0584 0.9702 2.8042 1.0000 0.9865 1.0018 0.9702 0.9588
North Dakota 4.9290 0.5852 1.0584 0.8743 2.6690 1.0000 1.0419 1.0018 0.8743 0.9126
Ohio 4.9290 0.5580 1.0584 0.9571 2.7862 1.0000 0.9935 1.0018 0.9571 0.9526
Pennsylvania 4.9290 0.5614 1.0584 0.9462 2.7710 1.0000 0.9995 1.0018 0.9462 0.9475
Tennessee 4.9290 0.5525 1.0584 0.9755 2.8115 1.0000 0.9837 1.0018 0.9755 0.9613
Texas 4.9290 0.5502 1.0584 0.9832 2.8220 1.0000 0.9796 1.0018 0.9832 0.9649
Vermont 4.9290 0.5959 1.0584 0.8445 2.6254 1.0000 1.0610 1.0018 0.8445 0.8977
Virginia 4.9290 0.5553 1.0584 0.9659 2.7984 1.0000 0.9888 1.0018 0.9659 0.9568
Washington 4.9290 0.5991 1.0584 0.8359 2.6126 1.0000 1.0668 1.0018 0.8359 0.8933
Wisconsin 4.9290 0.5584 1.0584 0.9559 2.7845 1.0000 0.9942 1.0018 0.9559 0.9521
Importer: Out of Gravity sample
Alaska 4.9290 0.5779 1.0584 0.8954 2.6993 1.0000 1.0289 1.0018 0.8954 0.9229
Arkansas 4.9290 0.5530 1.0584 0.9737 2.8090 1.0000 0.9846 1.0018 0.9737 0.9604
Colorado 4.9290 0.5556 1.0584 0.9650 2.7971 1.0000 0.9893 1.0018 0.9650 0.9564
Connecticut 4.9290 0.5544 1.0584 0.9692 2.8028 1.0000 0.9870 1.0018 0.9692 0.9583
Delaware 4.9290 0.5542 1.0584 0.9699 2.8038 1.0000 0.9867 1.0018 0.9699 0.9587
District of Columbia 4.9290 0.5468 1.0584 0.9950 2.8380 1.0000 0.9735 1.0018 0.9950 0.9704
Hawaii 4.9290 0.5562 1.0584 0.9632 2.7946 1.0000 0.9903 1.0018 0.9632 0.9555
Iowa 4.9290 0.5549 1.0584 0.9674 2.8003 1.0000 0.9880 1.0018 0.9674 0.9575
Kansas 4.9290 0.5517 1.0584 0.9780 2.8149 1.0000 0.9823 1.0018 0.9780 0.9625
Mississippi 4.9290 0.5576 1.0584 0.9585 2.7881 1.0000 0.9928 1.0018 0.9585 0.9533
Nebraska 4.9290 0.5500 1.0584 0.9837 2.8227 1.0000 0.9793 1.0018 0.9837 0.9651
Nevada 4.9290 0.5559 1.0584 0.9641 2.7958 1.0000 0.9897 1.0018 0.9641 0.9559
New Mexico 4.9290 0.5527 1.0584 0.9746 2.8102 1.0000 0.9841 1.0018 0.9746 0.9609
Oklahoma 4.9290 0.5668 1.0584 0.9292 2.7473 1.0000 1.0091 1.0018 0.9292 0.9393
Oregon 4.9290 0.5546 1.0584 0.9683 2.8017 1.0000 0.9875 1.0018 0.9683 0.9579
Rhode Island 4.9290 0.5530 1.0584 0.9738 2.8091 1.0000 0.9846 1.0018 0.9738 0.9605
South Carolina 4.9290 0.5701 1.0584 0.9190 2.7329 1.0000 1.0150 1.0018 0.9190 0.9344
South Dakota 4.9290 0.5594 1.0584 0.9526 2.7799 1.0000 0.9960 1.0018 0.9526 0.9505
Utah 4.9290 0.5599 1.0584 0.9509 2.7776 1.0000 0.9969 1.0018 0.9509 0.9497
West Virginia 4.9290 0.5593 1.0584 0.9530 2.7805 1.0000 0.9958 1.0018 0.9530 0.9507
Wyoming 4.9290 0.5479 1.0584 0.9911 2.8328 1.0000 0.9755 1.0018 0.9911 0.9686
Notes: Border effects are decomposed as indicated by (37).
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Table 4: Regional border effects
Benchmark (1), k = 9.5
Regional BE
Br
State/province In Gravity sample
Alberta 6.4824
British Columbia 7.5924
Manitoba 7.3196
New Brunswick 6.6774
Newfoundland 6.5406
Nova Scotia 6.2810
Ontario 7.6515
Prince Edward Island 6.2101
Quebec 7.1930
Saskatchewan 7.0252
Alabama 3.2538
Arizona 3.3001
California 3.2324
Florida 3.2529
Georgia 3.2448
Idaho 3.3087
Illinois 3.2387
Indiana 3.2186
Kentucky 3.2229
Louisiana 3.2669
Maine 3.4637
Maryland 3.2203
Massachusetts 3.3350
Michigan 3.2037
Minnesota 3.2962
Missouri 3.2626
Montana 3.4463
New Hampshire 3.3566
New Jersey 3.2291
New York 3.2761
North Carolina 3.2423
North Dakota 3.3872
Ohio 3.1975
Pennsylvania 3.2105
Tennessee 3.2401
Texas 3.2807
Vermont 3.3659
Virginia 3.2332
Washington 3.1195
Wisconsin 3.2499
State/province Out of Gravity sample
Alaska 3.4068
Arkansas 3.2693
Colorado 3.3327
Connecticut 3.2860
Delaware 3.2330
Hawaii 3.2810
Iowa 3.2888
Kansas 3.2646
Mississippi 3.3020
Nebraska 3.2402
Nevada 3.3157
New Mexico 3.2885
Oklahoma 3.1705
Oregon 3.3157
Rhode Island 3.2479
South Carolina 3.3580
South Dakota 3.3340
Utah 3.2151
West Virginia 3.3429
Wyoming 3.1921
District of Columbia 3.2701
Notes: See Section 5 for details on computations.
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Table 5: The impacts of fully removing the border, holding
all other parameters fixed
Benchmark (1), k = 9.5
Wage Cutoff Markups Consumed Produced Welfare
∆(wr)% ∆(m
d
r)% ∆(αEr/N
c
r )% ∆(N
c
r )% ∆(N
p
r )% ∆U
∗
r%
State/province In Gravity sample
Alberta 2.4445 -4.6785 -2.3487 4.9085 -36.5674 4.9081
British Columbia 5.8387 -10.4167 -5.1864 11.6282 -31.8922 11.6280
Manitoba 4.7407 -8.6195 -4.2879 9.4331 -57.5273 9.4325
New Brunswick 2.5620 -4.8865 -2.4503 5.1382 -37.8699 5.1375
Newfoundland 2.4401 -4.6708 -2.3454 4.9004 -36.5184 4.8996
Nova Scotia 2.0448 -3.9661 -2.0030 4.1305 -31.9176 4.1299
Ontario 5.1635 -9.3179 -4.6357 10.2755 -60.5130 10.2754
Prince Edward Island 1.7870 -3.5021 -1.7788 3.6303 -28.7279 3.6292
Quebec 4.2339 -7.7714 -3.8666 8.4264 -43.9461 8.4262
Saskatchewan 4.0207 -7.4108 -3.6886 8.0046 -51.8805 8.0040
Alabama 0.0000 -0.1911 -0.1916 0.1920 -1.8010 0.1915
Arizona 0.0275 -0.2435 -0.2164 0.2445 -2.2891 0.2441
California -0.0353 -0.1241 -0.1593 0.1242 -1.1727 0.1242
Florida -0.0341 -0.1263 -0.1606 0.1267 -1.1937 0.1265
Georgia 0.0040 -0.1987 -0.1951 0.1995 -1.8718 0.1991
Idaho 0.2719 -0.7060 -0.4367 0.7117 -6.5094 0.7110
Illinois 0.0103 -0.2107 -0.2007 0.2115 -1.9838 0.2111
Indiana 0.0670 -0.3184 -0.2521 0.3199 -2.9845 0.3194
Kentucky 0.0706 -0.3252 -0.2553 0.3268 -3.0467 0.3262
Louisiana -0.0180 -0.1569 -0.1753 0.1576 -1.4802 0.1571
Maine 0.9919 -2.0500 -1.0791 2.0936 -17.8625 2.0929
Maryland 0.0344 -0.2564 -0.2226 0.2575 -2.4096 0.2571
Massachusetts 0.0854 -0.3533 -0.2685 0.3549 -3.3060 0.3545
Michigan 0.2490 -0.6629 -0.4158 0.6676 -6.1226 0.6673
Minnesota 0.1705 -0.5144 -0.3453 0.5175 -4.7813 0.5171
Missouri 0.0313 -0.2507 -0.2199 0.2517 -2.3560 0.2513
Montana 0.6067 -1.3344 -0.7366 1.3532 -11.9816 1.3525
New Hampshire 0.3360 -0.8267 -0.4942 0.8343 -7.5835 0.8336
New Jersey 0.0221 -0.2331 -0.2114 0.2340 -2.1926 0.2336
New York 0.1807 -0.5337 -0.3542 0.5367 -4.9567 0.5366
North Carolina 0.0509 -0.2878 -0.2375 0.2891 -2.7013 0.2887
North Dakota 0.5729 -1.2712 -0.7065 1.2885 -11.4446 1.2876
Ohio 0.1189 -0.4168 -0.2987 0.4189 -3.8900 0.4185
Pennsylvania 0.1763 -0.5255 -0.3504 0.5286 -4.8824 0.5283
Tennessee 0.0235 -0.2358 -0.2129 0.2369 -2.2181 0.2364
Texas -0.0157 -0.1613 -0.1772 0.1618 -1.5221 0.1616
Vermont 0.7474 -1.5968 -0.8621 1.6235 -14.1800 1.6227
Virginia 0.0729 -0.3296 -0.2573 0.3311 -3.0880 0.3307
Washington 0.7991 -1.6929 -0.9076 1.7223 -14.9732 1.7221
Wisconsin 0.1253 -0.4288 -0.3046 0.4311 -4.0003 0.4307
State/province Out of Gravity sample
Alaska 0.4531 -1.0470 -0.5992 1.0587 -9.5150 1.0580
Arkansas 0.0329 -0.2537 -0.2215 0.2550 -2.3844 0.2543
Colorado 0.0778 -0.3388 -0.2618 0.3404 -3.6919 0.3399
Connecticut 0.0563 -0.2979 -0.2423 0.2993 -2.7949 0.2988
Delaware 0.0527 -0.2911 -0.2394 0.2928 -2.7313 0.2919
Hawaii -0.0753 -0.0478 -0.1232 0.0480 -0.4534 0.0478
Iowa 0.0872 -0.3568 -0.2704 0.3586 -3.3385 0.3581
Kansas 0.0655 -0.3155 -0.2508 0.3170 -2.9572 0.3165
Mississippi 0.0109 -0.2118 -0.2015 0.2128 -1.9937 0.2122
Nebraska 0.1117 -0.4030 -0.2925 0.4053 -3.7640 0.4047
Nevada -0.0184 -0.1561 -0.1746 0.1565 -1.4733 0.1564
New Mexico 0.0824 -0.3475 -0.2661 0.3493 -3.2531 0.3487
Oklahoma 0.0283 -0.2449 -0.2172 0.2461 -2.3026 0.2455
Oregon 0.2671 -0.6969 -0.4321 0.7022 -6.4283 0.7018
Rhode Island 0.0604 -0.3058 -0.2463 0.3075 -2.8680 0.3068
South Carolina 0.0325 -0.2528 -0.2210 0.2540 -2.3758 0.2534
South Dakota 0.3225 -0.8013 -0.4822 0.8086 -7.3582 0.8078
Utah 0.1426 -0.4616 -0.3203 0.4644 -4.3000 0.4637
West Virginia 0.1514 -0.4782 -0.3283 0.4812 -4.4519 0.4805
Wyoming 0.1404 -0.4575 -0.3183 0.4602 -4.2628 0.4596
District of Columbia -0.0558 -0.0849 -0.1413 0.0857 -0.8035 0.0850
Notes: See Section 5 for details on computations.
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Table 6: Determinants of changes in regional variables
Dependent variable (in logs)
Wage Cutoff Markup Consumed Produced Welfare
∆(wr)% ∆(m
d
r)% ∆(αEr/N
c
r )% ∆(N
c
r )% ∆(N
p
r )% ∆U
∗
r%
Variable Estimated coefficients, (All regions, N = 61 observations)
CA-dummy 1.4521∗∗∗ -2.5945∗∗∗ -1.2588∗∗∗ 2.8260∗∗∗ -15.9342∗∗∗ 2.8260∗∗∗
DISTANCE TO BORDER (log) -0.4323∗∗∗ 0.7740∗∗∗ 0.3752∗∗∗ -0.8412∗∗∗ 3.6000∗∗∗ -0.8412∗∗∗
SIZE (log) 0.1030 -0.1659 -0.0834 0.2066 0.1876 0.2066
Constant -23.4138∗∗∗ 41.3466∗∗∗ 20.0083∗∗∗ -45.4731∗∗∗ 242.1900∗∗∗ -45.473∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.8490 0.8584 0.8553 0.8460 0.8767 0.8460
Variable Estimated coefficients, (All regions, N = 61 observations)
DISTANCE TO BORDER (log) -1.0115∗∗∗ 1.7066∗∗∗ 0.8445∗∗∗ -2.0038∗∗∗ -3.9498 -2.0038∗∗∗
DISTANCE TO BORDER (log) × US-dummy 0.7734∗∗∗ -1.2583∗∗∗ -0.6308∗∗∗ 1.5478∗∗∗ 7.9061∗ 1.5478∗∗∗
SIZE (log) 0.6001∗∗∗ -1.0361∗∗∗ -0.5085∗∗∗ 1.1802∗∗∗ -4.9348∗∗∗ 1.1802∗∗∗
SIZE (log) × US-dummy -0.6749∗∗∗ 1.1771∗∗∗ 0.5758∗∗∗ -1.3234∗∗∗ 6.1818∗∗∗ -1.3234∗∗∗
US-dummy 1.6685 -3.3316 -1.5584 3.1246 -102.0723∗∗∗ 3.1250
Constant 1.2010 -2.2619 -1.2102 2.5624 52.4719∗ 2.5592
Adjusted R2 0.9288 0.9266 0.9253 0.9216 0.9063 0.9216
Variable Beta coefficients (Only US States, N = 51 observations)
DISTANCE TO BORDER (log) -0.6205∗∗∗ 0.6212∗∗∗ 0.6208∗∗∗ -0.6203∗∗∗ 0.6235∗∗∗ -0.6203∗∗∗
SIZE (log) -0.3390∗∗∗ 0.3394∗∗∗ 0.3398∗∗∗ -0.3391∗∗∗ 0.3418∗∗∗ -0.3391∗∗∗
Notes: See Section 5 for additional details on computations. Coefficients significant at 10% level (∗), 5% level (∗∗), and 1% level (∗∗∗).
Table 7: Firm-level export intensities and export sales distributions
Benchmark (1), k = 9.5
US US US Canada
Export intensity Percent of exporter Percent of exporters Percent of exporters Percent of exporters
(percent) (1992 Census, BEJK) (BEJK simul.) (our simul., with border) (our simul., with border)
0-10 66 76 65.16 41.81
10-20 16 19 27.50 13.28
20-30 7.7 4.2 4.05 15.96
30-40 4.4 0.0 0.97 16.38
40-50 2.4 0.0 0.78 5.65
50-60 1.5 0.0 1.23 2.26
60-70 1.0 0.0 0.31 1.41
70-80 0.6 0.0 0.00 0.71
80-90 0.5 0.0 0.00 1.27
90-100 0.7 0.0 0.00 1.27
US US US Canada Canada
Firm rank Percent of exp. sales Percent of exp. sales Percent of exp. sales Percent of exp. sales Percent of exp. sales
(exporters) (1993 Census, BJS) (with border) (without border) (with border) (without border)
Top 1% 78.2 29.13 40.91 51.53 38.63
Top 5% 91.8 67.18 69.16 85.33 71.26
Top 10% 95.6 80.16 78.28 91.91 83.62
Top 25% 98.7 92.65 89.98 96.83 94.05
Top 50% 99.7 97.91 96.96 99.15 98.56
Notes: See Section 5 for additional details. Export intensity is defined as in Appendix D as the firm’s share of export revenue in total revenue. Export
sales are also defined as in Appendix D. Figures in Column 2 and 3 (top panel) are provided by Bernard et al. (2003). Column 2 reports the observed
distribution using 1992 US Manufactuting Census data, whereas Column 3 provides the simulation results of Bernard et al. (2003). Columns 4 and 5
provide our own simulation results with k = 9.5. Figures in Column 2 (bottom panel) are provided by Bernard et al. (2009) using 1993 Census data.
Columns 3-6 in the bottom half provide our own simulation results with k = 9.5.
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Figure 1: National productivity distributions (CA and US, with border)
0
10
20
30
40
50
.05 .1 .15 .2
x
Non−exporters Exporters
Productivity distribution in CA (with border)
0
10
20
30
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
x
Non−exporters Exporters
Productivity distribution in US (with border)
Figure 2: Producers’ and sellers’ distributions (with and without border)
0
10
20
30
40
50
.05 .1 .15 .2
x
With border Without border
Productivity distribution of producers in CA
0
10
20
30
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
x
With border Without border
Productivity distribution of producers in US
0
10
20
30
40
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
x
With border Without border
Productivity distribution of sellers in CA
0
10
20
30
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
x
With border Without border
Productivity distribution of sellers in US
44
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
941 David Marsden 
Richard Belfield 
Institutions and the Management of Human 
Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France 
and Great Britain 
940 Elhanan Helpman 
Oleg Itskhoki 
Stephen Redding 
Inequality and Unemployment in a Global 
Economy 
939 Norman Ireland 
Robin A. Naylor 
Jeremy Smith 
Shqiponja Telhaj 
Educational Returns, Ability Composition and 
Cohort Effects: Theory and Evidence for 
Cohorts of Early-Career UK Graduates 
938 Guy Mayraz 
Jürgen Schupp 
Gert Wagner 
Life Satisfaction and Relative Income: 
Perceptions and Evidence 
937 Nicholas Bloom 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
The Organization of Firms Across Countries 
936 Jean-Baptiste Michau Unemployment Insurance and Cultural 
Transmission: Theory and Application to 
European Unemployment 
935 João M. C. Santos-Silva 
Silvana Tenreyro 
Trading Partners and Trading Volumes: 
Implementing the Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein 
Model Empirically 
934 Christian Morrisson 
Fabrice Murtin 
The Century of Education 
933 João M. C. Santos-Silva 
Silvana Tenreyro 
Further Simulation Evidence on the 
Performance of the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator 
932 João M. C. Santos-Silva 
Silvana Tenreyro 
On the Existence of the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates for Poisson Regressioin 
931 Richard Freeman 
John Van Reenen 
What If Congress Doubled R&D Spending on 
the Physical Sciences? 
930 Hector Calvo-Pardo 
Caroline Freund 
Emanuel Ornelas 
The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Impact on 
Trade Flows and External Trade Barriers 
929 Dan Anderberg 
Arnaud Chevalier 
Jonathan Wadsworth 
Anatomy of a Health Scare: Education, Income 
and the MMR Controversy in the UK 
928 Christos Genakos 
Mario Pagliero 
Risk Taking and Performance in Multistage 
Tournaments: Evidence from Weightlifting 
Competitions 
927 Nick Bloom 
Luis Garicano 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
The Distinct Effects of Information 
Technology and Communication Technology 
on Firm Organization 
926 Reyn van Ewijk Long-term health effects on the next 
generation of Ramadan fasting during 
pregnancy 
925 Stephen J. Redding The Empirics of New Economic Geography 
924 Rafael Gomez 
Alex Bryson 
Tobias Kretschmer 
Paul Willman 
Employee Voice and Private Sector Workplace 
Outcomes in Britain, 1980-2004 
923 Bianca De Paoli Monetary Policy Under Alterative Asset 
Market Structures: the Case of a Small Open 
Economy 
922 L. Rachel Ngai 
Silvana Tenreyro 
Hot and Cold Seasons in the Housing Market 
921 Kosuke Aoki 
Gianluca Benigno 
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki 
Capital Flows and Asset Prices 
920 Alex Bryson 
John Forth 
Patrice Laroche 
Unions and Workplace Performance in Britain 
and France 
919 David Marsden 
Simone Moriconi 
‘The Value of Rude Health’: Employees’ Well 
Being, Absence and Workplace Performance 
918 Richard Layard 
Guy Mayraz 
Stephen Nickell 
Does Relative Income Matter? Are the Critics 
Right? 
917 Ralf Martin 
Laure B. de Preux 
Ulrich J. Wagner 
The Impacts of the Climate Change Levy on 
Business: Evidence from Microdata 
916 Paul-Antoine Chevalier 
Rémy Lecat 
Nicholas Oulton 
Convergence of Firm-Level Productivity, 
Globalisation, Information Technology and 
Competition: Evidence from France 
915 Ghazala Azmat 
Nagore Iriberri 
The Importance of Relative Performance 
Feedback Information: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment using High School 
Students 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7284  Fax 020 7955 7595  Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  
